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NAKED PRICE AND PHARMACEUTICAL TRADE SECRET
OVERREACH
Robin Feldman* & Charles Tait Graves†
22 YALE J.L. & TECH. 61 (2020)
Trade secret has drifted from a quiet backwater doctrine to a
pervasive force in intellectual property. As always, the risk of
distortion is great when a legal arena is developing and expanding
rapidly. Nowhere do the theoretical tensions of trade secret law
appear in such stark relief as in the modern pharmaceutical debates,
where the heart of the theoretical question involves whether pricing
is a proper subject for trade secrecy claims.
We aim to bring trade secret into greater harmony with broad
concepts that reach across all intellectual property regimes. As with
other areas of intellectual property law, trade secret law is not a
mere contest of private commercial interests. Rather, it embeds
substantial dedication to the public interest, reflecting utilitarian
balancing of key societal interests. In this context, we develop the
concept of “thin” trade secret, looking to the analogous concepts in
other intellectual property regimes. Such approaches embody the
recognition that intellectual property rights are not solid monoliths,
presenting an impenetrable wall through which no party but the
rights holder may pass. Rather, they are brilliantly nimble and
subtle systems, deftly threading their way among various societal
goals.
This Article offers the potential of anchoring trade secret more
firmly to its theoretical base, as well as bringing trade secret closer
to the family of other intellectual property regimes. Although
squabbling, chaotic, and somewhat dispersed, all members of this
time-honored family can learn from each other, sharing their battleworn wisdom with the newest, young upstart.
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INTRODUCTION
The rising cost of prescription drugs in the United States presents a
critical challenge in modern public policy. As prices rise sharply
across all medications—from new, life-saving treatments for
Hepatitis C1 and HIV2 to ordinary medications for more common
ailments such as heart disease and diabetes3—personal and public
budgets are straining to absorb the impact. New cancer treatments
coming online at the million-dollar-per-patient mark4 only worsen
the stress on the health care system. On the whole, these pricing
trajectories threaten to roll back decades of improvement in access
to health care for those at all income levels.5
The problem is receiving growing attention from lawmakers,
regulators, and the media.6 Absent from this flurry of attention, as
well as from the bulk of the broader literature, is the role that certain
intellectual property regimes are playing.7
Specifically, to shield pricing arrangements in the pharmaceutical
supply chain from scrutiny by regulators alone as well as from
public scrutiny resulting from some forms of regulatory
transparency, companies have turned to bold claims that prices, in
and of themselves, are trade secrets and thus immune from
regulatory disclosure. This Article challenges that notion to promote
pricing transparency for the ultimate benefit of consumers. To
critique these industry claims on intellectual property grounds, we
1

See Brandy Henry, Drug Pricing & Challenges to Hepatitis C Treatment Access,
14 J. HEALTH BIOMED LAW 265, 266 (2018).
2
See Shefali Luthra & Anna Gorman, Out-of-Pocket Costs Put HIV Prevention
Drug Out of Reach for Many at Risk, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 3, 2018),
https://khn.org/news/out-of-pocket-costs-put-hiv-prevention-drug-out-of-reachfor-many-at-risk.
3
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-0315-0080, INCREASES IN REIMBURSEMENT FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS IN PART D
(2018) [hereinafter HHS INSPECTOR GENERAL]; see also CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERV., DRUG SPENDING INFORMATION PRODUCTS FACT SHEET (2018);
Ned Pagliarulo, To Shame Drugmakers, CMS Publicizes Price Hikes,
BIOPHARMA DIVE (May 16, 2018), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/toshame-drugmakers-cms-publicizes-price-hikes/523693.
4
See Jonathan D. Rockoff, The Million-Dollar Cancer Treatment: Who Will
Pay?, WALL ST. J. (April 26, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-milliondollar-cancer-treatment-no-one-knows-how-to-pay-for-1524740401.
5
See ROBIN FELDMAN, DRUGS, MONEY, & SECRET HANDSHAKES: THE
UNSTOPPABLE GROWTH OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES 9–10 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 2019) (describing the impact of rising drug prices on those who have private
insurance, public insurance, and the uninsured).
6
See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
7
See infra text accompanying notes 106–122 (containing a literature review).
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discuss the underdeveloped state of theory in trade secret law.
Ultimately, we offer grounds for rejecting claims that “naked prices”
in the pharmaceutical supply chain are trade secrets based on
contemporary conceptions of trade secret—and we borrow from
copyright law to advance a new concept of “thin” trade secret
protection amenable to appropriate regulatory challenges.
That companies have turned to trade secret claims as a weapon
against state regulators comes as no surprise. Trade secret law
encompasses the rules governing business information that, to
receive protection, must be nonpublic, of competitive value,
guarded with reasonably security measures, and not readily
ascertainable. By all accounts, trade secret law is an increasingly
important area of intellectual property law. This is so not only in
civil litigation and in espionage-related trade secret indictments, but
also in a surprising number of areas outside the traditional litigation
context including public infrastructure, medical device data, and
access to technologies used by the prosecution in ordinary criminal
cases.8 As scholars have noted, trade secret has drifted from a quiet
backwater doctrine to “the most pervasive form of intellectual
property in the modern economy.” 9 The rise of trade secret in
modern jurisprudence has been driven by a multitude of factors. In
2016, President Obama signed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (the
“Federal Act” or DTSA), a comprehensive law that, for the first time,
provided a federal civil cause of action for trade secret
misappropriation. 10 Even before passage of the Federal Act,
companies increasingly looked for shelter under the wings of state
trade secret laws as Supreme Court decisions limited the protections
available under patent law.11 More broadly, the rise in trade secret
is fueled by the explosive growth in the technology sector—and in
the everyday use and reliance in the workplace on scientific and

8

See infra notes 48–53 and accompanying text.
See Peter S. Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret
Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017); see also Deepa Varadarajan, The Uses
of IP Misuse, 68 EMORY L.J. 741, 783 (2019) (describing the modern rise of trade
secret and quoting Menell).
10
The Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 was embedded into the existing
Economic Espionage Act of 1995. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39.
11
See generally David S. Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapiznikow,
Whitney E. McCollum & Jill Winder, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZAGA L. REV. 291 (2010); David S.
Almeling, Darin W. Snyder, Michael Sapiznikow, Whitney E. McCollum & Jill
Winder, A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46
GONZAGA L. REV. 57 (2011); Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 250 (2013).
9
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technical information that is not public, but also may not be patented
or copyrightable.12
At the same time, uncertainty about the nature of trade secret law
makes it an inviting area to exploit. Trade secret law exists as both
state law and federal law, and it also crops up in administrative
disputes. In part because of this sprawl, legal theory in the trade
secret arena does not always unfold in a coherent and consistent
manner.13
But as corporate claims of trade secret rights grow, there is a
gathering chorus of criticism regarding the effect of such claims on
the public interest. 14 Just as trade secret law itself is not always
uniform across jurisdictions and individual rulings, however,
scholars and commentators do not always speak in the same voice
when focusing on seemingly unrelated areas of trade secret disputes.
To help bridge these gaps, we offer theories of trade secret law to
critique secrecy assertions in the pharmaceutical pricing context, but
that have wider and general application.
Part of the problem is mundane—those working in different areas of
law have yet to compare notes about these emerging issues, and to
seek common ground to approach related public policy problems.
But the problem is one of theory as well in this still-underdeveloped
area. Philosophical confusion over the nature of trade secret law—
as a property theory, based on whether a defined item of information
qualifies as intellectual property, or as a relational theory, based on
looser notions that someone agreed to hold broad areas of
“confidential information” in trust, with less attention to whether
information meets criteria for protection—creates theoretical
uncertainty. Choosing one starting point or the other can lead to
12

See supra note 11.
To be sure, the gradual adoption of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) and
the DTSA’s enactment in 2016 reflect significant gains in coherence. As Sharon
Sandeen has shown in her work on the drafting history of the UTSA, these
statutory regimes offer a largely consistent framework – a marked improvement
over prior common law regimes. See Sharon Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade
Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When They Do Not Follow the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L.R. 493 (2010); see also Sharon
Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade
Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829 (2017) (noting that emerging DTSA
case law tends to rely on existing UTSA case law). However, trade secret law
still has a long way to go. Patent law, for example, gained coherence only
gradually through the adoption of patent-specific local court rules, the creation of
Markman hearings and the Patent Trials and Appeal Board (PTAB), and
important Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions on issues such as software
patents and presumptions in requests for injunctive relief.
14
See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text.
13
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substantially different, if inadvertent, real-world outcomes. In this
Article, we explore historical reasons for this divergence. We also
suggest that harmonizing the philosophical background of these
debates and adopting a strong conception that trade secret rights
must be established as specific, discrete items of property will best
promote the public interest within the parameters of these nowdominant statutory definitions of trade secret rights. This move is
not simply one of abstract theory, but one that would also change
the manner in which these courtroom disputes have been litigated,
and thus have a lasting and immediate impact on regulatory
outcomes.
We focus on industry assertions of trade secrecy deployed to resist
consumer-friendly efforts by regulatory bodies to require
transparency in drug pricing as the vehicle for this analysis.
Nowhere do the theoretical tensions of trade secret law appear in
such stark relief as in the modern pharmaceutical debates. In these
battles, one can see the confusion in modern trade secret law, along
with the potential for trampling and distorting core theoretical
concepts in this arena. And as always, the risk of distortion is great
when an area of law is developing and expanding rapidly. If society
fails to impose some measure of logic and order, a dangerous
overreach of trade secret claims may be upon us.
We will refer to negotiated drug prices in the pharmaceutical context
as “naked price” and will frame the issues at the heart of these
debates in the following manner. First, are naked prices intellectual
property? Second, if so, do they constitute sufficient intellectual
property to create an immunity to public disclosure when the public
interest is strong? In other words, if naked price is an appropriate
form of intellectual property, is it a “thin” right?
The issues are playing out on a broad, national platform. Middle
players in the drug distribution chain called Pharmacy Benefit
Managers (PBMs) insist that their pricing arrangements with
pharmaceutical manufacturers constitute “trade secrets.” On the
other side, state regulators seek disclosure of such information to
expose industry structures that drive up pricing and harm the public,
arguing that such arrangements should not receive trade secret
protection. We discuss recent examples in Nevada, California, and
Ohio, as well as the broader history of pricing in civil trade secret
and Freedom of Information Act disputes. As we will demonstrate,
it is not clear that courts, regulators, or legislatures have sufficiently
focused on whether such pricing actually can be claimed as a trade
secret, or whether such claims have firm support in the theoretical
foundations of trade secret law.
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That clash – and the theoretical question of whether pricing, at least
in this context, is a proper subject for trade secrecy claims at all – is
the primary focus of this Article. Indeed, this essay traces the
emergence of naked price as a claimed trade secret. It suggests that
such claims, at least in the context of PBM pharmaceutical pricing
arrangements, are not well-grounded in the theory of trade secret
law. Building upon the pioneering insights of earlier commentators,
we offer a theory of why this type of pricing should not receive trade
secret protection – or, if it does, why such protection should be thin
and undeserving of immunity from regulation in the public interest.
In summary, we propose the following:
•

•
•

•

Industry claims that naked price constitutes a protectable
trade secret in the PBM pharmaceutical context pose a threat
to consumers, and more broadly reflect a worrying trend
towards overreach in trade secret law;
A property-centered theory of trade secret law poses the best
approach for challenging such assertions;
A new concept of “thin” trade secret rights, inspired by
analogous concepts in copyright law, can be applied to naked
price. Thus, even if PBM pricing arrangements made it
across the line for trade secret status, such protection would
not pose an impassable barrier to appropriate regulatory
disclosure.
By harmonizing different strands of recent commentary
about overreaching trade secret claims in a host of areas
outside the typical trade secret litigation context, it is
possible to create common theoretical approaches to similar
public policy problems.

Prior literature, examining trade secret protection in the context of
medical device pricing, focusses on an element of the 1939
Restatement of Torts which predates the passage of modern federal
and state legislation. In contrast, we analyze the modern landscape
under the recently enacted Defend Trade Secrets Act and the modern
state Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), diving into the underlying
theory of trade secrecy to make sense of this intersection of
intellectual property and regulatory disclosure. We conclude that
naked price information is not a good candidate for trade secret
status, especially when proffered to inhibit regulatory disclosure in
the pharmaceutical pricing context where the public interest is
strong.
This Article demonstrates how existing trade secret doctrines
provide the tools that courts and regulators can use when grappling
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with industry claims that PBM pricing constitutes trade secrets.
Borrowing from the world of civil trade secret litigation, we point
to requirements that a trade secret claimant specifically identify each
separate asserted trade secret with particularity, that artificial
combination trade secret claims be disaggregated, and that sweeping
claims that entire fields or subject areas constitute trade secrets be
challenged. Courts and regulators need not give credence to
conclusory declarations of trade secrecy and ghostwritten affidavits
from the industry.
Ultimately, our specific proposals regarding PBM pricing and our
more general philosophical statements regarding the normative
grounding of trade secret claims stem from the observation that the
statutes which grant trade secret rights are not absolutes. They
reflect utilitarian economic legislation designed to balance the
respective interests of employers, employees, business partners, and
the public by creating limited rights to incentivize investment in
research and laboratory infrastructure. Trade secrets are not some
objective, metaphysical rights found in nature. Indeed, both the
Federal Act and the state Uniform Trade Secrets Acts are riddled
with limitations and exceptions, from the right of others to
independently develop the exact same information and to discern the
trade secret through reverse engineering, to the simple loss of rights
if the owner fails to use appropriate security measures. This is not
an impregnable fortress against regulatory disclosure. Moreover,
neither the Federal Act nor the state Uniform Trade Secret Acts were
intended to radically enlarge trade secret protection – they seek
uniformity and clarity while offering a generally balanced regime.15
15

Compared to the prior Restatement approach, the Federal Act and state statutes
both strengthened and weakened the scope of trade secret protection on different
points, leading to a general balance rather than a radical departure in either
direction. The statutes, however, arguably offer a somewhat narrower regime.
For example, the statutes enlarged trade secret protection by rejecting the notion
that information must remain in continuous use to qualify for trade secrecy, and
the Federal Act increased protection for overseas activity. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1837.
But they also weakened protection by (in the case of most state statutes)
preempting broader, conflicting tort claims, and (in the case of the Federal Act)
creating a regime for disclosure by whistleblowers. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b). In
addition, the Federal Act and almost all state statutes enacted a provision
providing for an award of attorneys’ fees to the defense in cases of “bad faith” –
a disincentive for a plaintiff to pursue weak claims for anticompetitive or
malicious purposes. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(D). As the commentary to the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act notes, a primary goal of the statutes was “substitution
of unitary definitions of trade secret and trade secret misappropriation, and a
single statute of limitations for the various property, quasi-contractual, and
violation of fiduciary relationship theories of noncontractual liability utilized at
common law.” UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, commissioner’s prefatory note,
at 2 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1980).
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As with other areas of intellectual property law, then, trade secret
law is not a mere contest of private commercial interests. Rather, it
embeds a substantial dedication to the public interest by maintaining
a robust public domain excepting only that information which meets
the criteria of trade secrecy. But these themes are underdeveloped,
especially outside the civil litigation context. We aim to bring trade
secret into greater harmony with broad concepts that reach across all
of the intellectual property regimes, learning from society’s
experience in each. Similarly, in developing the concept of “thin”
trade secret protection, we look to the analogous concept of thin
protection for certain categories of work in copyright. We also look
to the emerging theory of trade secret misuse, which itself builds on
doctrines in patent and copyright. In each of these contexts, this
Article offers the potential of anchoring trade secret more firmly to
its theoretical base, as well as bringing trade secret closer to the
family of other intellectual property regimes. Although squabbling,
chaotic, and somewhat dispersed, all members of this time-honored
family can learn from each other, sharing their battle-worn wisdom
regarding this still-developing area.
I. THE PROBLEM: PBM PRICING AND TRADE SECRECY
ASSERTIONS
Prescription drug prices in the United States are rising at an
uncomfortable pace. New drugs on the market continue to break
ground, not just for their therapeutic value, but for their higher and
higher price points. For example, Novartis raised eyebrows in 2017
by introducing its leukemia drug Kymriah at a price point of
$475,000.16 Within two years, however, that ground-breaking price
was left in the dust by the $2.125 million price tag of Novartis’ new
drug Zolgensma, 17 which treats pediatric spinal atrophy and by
Spark Therapeutics’ Luxturna, which treats a rare form of blindness
and costs a hefty $850,000 for a one-time treatment.18
As the health care system struggles to swallow these bitter pills,
medicines for ordinary conditions are causing their fair share of pain.
According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
16

See Paul Kleutghen et al., Drugs Don’t Work if People Can’t Afford Them: The
High
Price
of
Tisagenlecleucel,
HEALTH
AFF.
(2018),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180205.292531/full.
17
See Adam Feuerstein, At $2.1 Million, Newly Approved Novartis Gene Therapy
Will Be World’s Most Expensive Drug, STAT+ (May 24, 2019),
https://www.statnews.com/2019/05/24/hold-novartis-zolgensma-approval.
18
See Meg Tirrell, A U.S. Drugmaker Offers to Cure Rare Blindness for
$850,000, CNBC (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/03/sparktherapeutics-luxturna-gene-therapy-will-cost-about-850000.html.
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the most costly drugs for Medicare patients in recent years were for
common conditions, such as diabetes, heart disease, and asthma.19
These drugs also experienced the sharpest price hikes as well. 20
Although drug companies provide substantial rebates and discounts
on their medications in certain circumstances, net price increases
continue to climb, 21 pushing real spending ever higher. On the
whole, between 2011 and 2015, Medicare spending for branded
drugs rose 62%.22 The increase during this period appears to be
attributable in large part to rising prices on existing medications.23
Prices in the United States are far above prices in other developed
countries.24
The economic implications are troubling on many levels. For
individual budgets, both studies and anecdotes demonstrate that
some patients are choosing to forgo medication or to engage in
rationing in response to cost pressures. 25 For government budgets,
19

See HHS INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 3.
See id.
21
See FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 9–11 (describing rising real prices and noting
that many people do pay for the high list price, either due to lack of insurance, to
meet a deductible, or as the basis of co-insurance); Workshop Slides, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Understanding Competition in Prescription Drug Markets: Entry and
Supply Chain Dynamics 107 (2017), www.ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2017/11/understanding-competition-prescription-drug-markets-entrysupply (estimating that net prices increased 4.5% in 2014); Dylan Scott, Inside
the Impossibly Byzantine World of Prescription Drug Prices, STAT (Dec. 21,
2015),
www.statnews.com/2015/12/21/prescription-drug-prices-confusion.
(pharmaceutical trade group report at FTC roundtable estimating that list prices
increased 3.5% in 2014). These increases far outpace inflation, which ranged from
less than 1% to 2% during the relevant period. See Current U.S. Inflation Rates:
2008
to
2018,
U.S.
INFLATION
CALCULATOR
(2018),
www.usinflationcalculator.com/inflation/current-inflation-rates.
22
HHS INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 3, at 4 (documenting the rise in total
spending despite the fact that rebates increased from $58 billion to $102 billion
during the period).
23
See Medicare Payment Advisory Comm’n, Report to the Congress: Medicare
Payment Policy 408 (2017) (concluding that rising prices on branded medications
are overwhelming the savings from generics).
24
See Simon F. Haeder, Why the US Has Higher Drug Prices Than Other
Countries, THE CONVERSATION (Feb. 7, 2019), https://theconversation.com/whythe-us-has-higher-drug-prices-than-other-countries-111256; Robert Langreth,
Drug
Prices,
BLOOMBERG,
(Feb.
5,
2019),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/drug-prices.
25
See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, AND MED., MAKING MEDICINES
AFFORDABLE: A NATIONAL IMPERATIVE 110, 116 (Norman R. Augustine, Guru
Madhavan & Sharyl J. Nass, eds., 2017) (explaining that patient “sticker shock”
at the pharmacy leads them to forgo filling the prescription or extend their
medication by reducing dosages); see also Robyn Tamblyn et al., The Incidence
and Determinants of Primary Nonadherence with Prescribed Medication in
Primary Care: A Cohort Study, 160 ANN. INTERN. MED. 441–50 (2014) (study
20
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the increasing costs are placing great strain on state and federal
coffers, as officials struggle to find the necessary resources. In the
words of Andy Slavitt, the former Acting Administrator of the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, these prices are simply
“unsustainable.”26
One would expect market forces to mitigate the rising costs.
Unfortunately, perverse incentives, along with externalities and
information asymmetries, operate to blunt the natural competitive
forces society might otherwise enjoy.27 To begin with, the normal
valuation process that help buyers choose among different types of
expenditures—buying a suit as opposed to dinner at a restaurant—
become distorted in the health care setting. My life and my health
may be of infinite value to me, particularly when someone else is
footing the bill. In that manner, both the valuation and the true cost
of the goods are lost, given the nature of the goods and our thirdparty payor system.28

showing that patients with higher co-pays, recent hospitalizations, other severe
health problems, or combinations of these factors were less likely to fill their
prescriptions); PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL, PROMOTING VALUE,
AFFORDABILITY, AND INNOVATION IN CANCER DRUG TREATMENT. A REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL
17 (Mar. 2018), https://prescancerpanel.cancer.gov/report/drugvalue/pdf/
PresCancerPanel_DrugValue_Mar2018.pdf (detailing that higher out-of-pocket
costs makes it less likely for patients to adhere to recommended treatment
regimens or undergo financial hardship); Financial Toxicity and Cancer
Treatment (PDQ®)–Health Professional Version, NAT’L CANCER INST.,
https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/managing-care/track-care-costs/financialtoxicity-hp-pdq (last visited May 3, 2018) (study on financial burden of cancer
treatments noting how high costs have resulted in cancer patients selling property
and other assets, incurring medical debt, reducing spending on necessities,
changing housing, and declaring bankruptcy).
26
See Ed Silverman, CMS Official Says Drug Costs Are “Unsustainable” and
There Are Too Many Bad Actors, STAT (Nov. 7, 2016),
https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/11/07/medicare-medicaid-drugprices.
27
See Robin Feldman, Perverse Incentives: Why Everyone Prefers High Drug
Prices—Except for Those Who Pay the Bills, HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming)
(describing perverse incentives and strategic behaviors in this highly regulated
industry), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3162432; Fiona
Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in the Pharmaceutical
Markets 2 (Hutchins Ctr. On Fiscal & Monetary Pol’y at Brookings, Working
Paper No. 30, 2017) (explaining that externalities and information asymmetries
prevent consumers from optimal substitution because they do not bear full costs
and lack medical expertise or reliable information to identify therapeutic
equivalents).
28
See FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 7, 88–93 (describing buying distortions in health
care and the problems with value-based pricing in that context).
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Other perverse incentives flow from the structure of industry, with
its central players the Pharmacy Benefit Managers (PBMs). PBMs
are middle players between drug companies and insurance plans—
including both private insurers and Medicare. On behalf of
insurance plans and patients, PBMs negotiate the prices of drugs
with the companies. PBMs also help the plans set formularies, which
determine whether patients will have access to a particular drug and
the terms of that access. In an ideal world, this system would allow
insurance plans and patients to pay the lowest cost possible for
brand-name drugs. In reality, the deals between PBMs and brand
companies frequently operate to channel patients into more
expensive drugs, with resulting long-term and short-term effects on
the system.
Although a full discussion of the PBMs and the drug supply chain
is beyond the scope of this Article, 29 certain aspects are important
for understanding the role that assertions of trade secrecy are playing
in this space. In simplified form, PBMs stand between their clients
(the health plans) and drug companies. Although a health plan
knows what it pays when a patient buys a particular drug at the
pharmacy, the true price is hidden. Somewhere down the line, the
health plan will receive a rebate check from the PBM that includes
rebates for this, and many other, drug transactions. Along the way,
PBMs pocket a large portion of the rebate dollars—as much as $166
billion each year30 by one estimate—although the health plans are
not permitted to know the size of the rebates or the portions retained.
In fact, the true net price, and the terms of the agreements between
PBMs and drug companies are highly guarded secrets; even the
health plan’s auditors are not given full access to the agreements.31
Moreover, given that PBMs help create their clients’ formularies,
PBMs and drug companies can strike deals that may not be in the
patient’s long-term interests. Recent case allegations and press
reports have described patients who are forced to pay more for
generics than for brand name drugs and patients completely blocked
from access to generic versions of a drug. For example, a complaint
filed in 2017 alleges that Allergan’s rebate scheme for its
blockbuster dry-eye drug Restasis blocked access for competing
29

For in an in-depth analysis of PBMs and perverse incentives in the drug supply
and pricing chain, see generally id.
30
See Peter Pitts, The White House’s About-Face on Drug Rebates Is a Loss for
Public
Health, STAT (July
11,
2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/07/11/drug-rebates-white-housedecision.
31
See Robin Feldman, Secrets, Conspiracies, and Rx Money—Here’s Why Drug
Prices Are Out of Control, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 6, 2019)
https://www.medpagetoday.com/publichealthpolicy/generalprofessionalissues/7
9644; see also FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 2–3 n.16.
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generics. 32 One Medicare plan administrator quoted in the
complaint explained that with the particular scheme, a new entrant
could give its drug away for free and still would not be able to gain
a foothold in the market. 33 Similarly, a recent case alleges that
Johnson and Johnson launched a rebate scheme for its rheumatoid
arthritis drug Remicade that induced hospitals and health plans to
essentially exclude the lower-priced biosimilar. 34 One physician
called practices such as these “Alice-in-Wonderland” in the drug
world.35 Moreover, these deals can maximize the payments that the
PBMs are able to keep, while keeping patients away from cheaper
generic drugs.
In addition, although PBMs represent the health plan as its clients,
the PBMs receive various large payments directly from the drug
companies. As well as the rebate portions mentioned above, PBMs
also receive various fees from drug companies, such as “data
management fees” and “administrative fees.”36 With the formulary
power of PBMs, these fees have the potential to encourage PBMs to
drive patients toward the companies that are offering more attractive
terms to them as a middle player, regardless of whether those terms
benefit patients in either the short or long-term. Again, these fees are
hidden from the health plan, from regulators, and from the public.37

32

Complaint at 6, 21–23, Shire US, Inc. v. Allergan, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 538
(D.N.J. 2019) (No. 17-7716).
33
See id. at 23–24 (Shire, the manufacturer of a competing drug called Xiidra,
states in the complaint that “Shire…has been told by Part D plans that even if
Shire gave Xiidra to Part D plans ‘for free,’ it could not make up for the plans’
loss of rebates across Allergan’s Part D product portfolio.”)
34
See Complaint at 1, Pfizer Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 333 F. Supp. 3d 494
(E.D. Pa. 2018) (No. 17-cv-4180); see also FELDMAN, supra note 5, at 26 n. 43
(case settled for $61.5 million alleging that when Sanofi faced competition on its
pediatric meningitis vaccine Menactra, the company charged 34% higher prices
unless buyers purchased all of Sanofi’s vaccines exclusively).
35
Charles Ornstein & Katie Thomas, Take the Generic, Patients Are Told. Until
They
Are
Not.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/06/health/prescription-drugs-brand-namegeneric.html (documenting patients who were forced to pay more for generic
Adderall).
36
See, e.g., Complaint at 6, Boss v. CVS Corp., No. 17-01823, (D.N.J., Mar. 17,
2017) (arguing that payments other than rebates are provided under a variety of
labels, including discounts, credits, concession fees, etc.); see also Linda Cahn,
Don’t Get Trapped By PBMs’ Rebate Labeling Games, MANAGED CARE (Jan. 1,
2009), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2009/1/don-t-get-trappedpbms-rebate-labeling-games.
37
PBMs that are public companies are required to provide SEC filings with
aggregate numbers related to their revenue. PBMs have resisted efforts by the
SEC to provide even modest amounts of additional information. See FELDMAN,
supra note 5, at 98.
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One might think that the health plans and their patients, let alone
government auditors, would have the right to know the net prices
they are paying for each drug and to access the terms of agreements
made on their behalf. So, just how is it that these terms are so deeply
hidden? PBMs and drug companies claim that net price is a trade
secret. It is under the cloak of trade secrecy that this system, and its
impact on rising prices, remains sheltered from view.
Lack of transparency prevents regulators from ferreting out
information and evaluating the behavior they are charged with
regulating. State and federal regulators govern the pharmaceutical
supply chain in myriad ways. Below are a sample of those
regulations, although a full description is well beyond the Article’s
scope. At the federal level, various agencies work in conjunction to
regulate the supply chain. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) oversees the delivery of pharmaceuticals in those
systems in hospitals and at pharmacies. Considering retail sales
alone, Medicaid and Medicare Part D payments account for 40% of
prescription drug spending.38 CMS also issues guidance documents
and proposes rules to explain how laws will be implemented, clarify
existing guidance, and address policy issues such as cost
transparency and spread pricing by pharmacy benefit managers.39
The FDA plays a crucial role in establishing pathways for drug
approval and regulating consumer disclosure. Since the enactment
of the Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Congress has tasked the
FDA with ensuring the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical
products. Various statutes such as the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
in 1938 and the 1962 Amendments to the FDC Act have given the
FDA the requisite authority to control labeling and advertising as
well as the development and approval processes for pharmaceuticals.
38

See Juliette Cubanski, Matthew Rae, Katherine Young & Anthony Damico,
How Does Prescription Drug Spending and Use Compare Across Large
Employer Plans, Medicare Part D, and Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (May 20,
2019),
https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/how-does-prescription-drugspending-and-use-compare-across-large-employer-plans-medicare-part-d-andmedicaid.
39
See Press Release, Cntrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Takes Bold
Action to Implement Key Elements of President Trump’s Executive Order to
Empower Patients with Price Transparency and Increase Competition to Lower
Costs
for
Medicare
Beneficiaries
(July
29,
2019),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-takes-bold-actionimplement-key-elements-president-trumps-executive-order-empower-patientsprice; Press Release, Cntrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Issues New
Guidance Addressing Spread Pricing in Medicaid, Ensures Pharmacy Benefit
Managers Are Not Up-Charging Taxpayers (May 15, 2019),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-issues-new-guidanceaddressing-spread-pricing-medicaid-ensures-pharmacy-benefit-managers-arenot.
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The FDA also participates in the rulemaking process and publishes
regulations and guidances on existing rules and arising issues.40 The
FTC and DOJ oversee mergers and challenge anticompetitive
behavior such as pay-for-delay tactics. Pay-for-delay agreements,
also known as reverse settlement agreements, involve brand-name
drug companies paying their generic competitors to delay market
entry, effectively blocking generic competition for brand-name
drugs.41 The USPTO is another major player within pharmaceutical
regulation. Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is incentivized
by patent protection benefits, and the USPTO decides whether a
pharmaceutical invention is sufficiently innovative to deserve patent
protection.
At the state level, state attorneys general have the power to challenge
anticompetitive behaviors under state antitrust laws and to allow instate mergers to go forward only on the condition of conduct
remedies supervised by the state. Such state antitrust regimes may
be broader than and differ from the federal regime.42 State consumer
protection statutes regulate the information provided to consumers
and unfair business practices. Regulation of insurance, which
includes regulation of the health insurance industry has been largely
a matter of state law since the congressional Kefauver amendment.
Medicaid is a federal program administered by the states, which
provides additional state regulation of pharmaceuticals. More
broadly, every state has its own laws and regulations guiding
40

See generally Guidances, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (May 24, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/industry/fda-basics-industry/guidances
(“Guidance
documents describe FDA’s interpretation of our policy on a regulatory issue (21
CFR 10.115(b)). These documents usually discuss more specific products or
issues that relate to the design, production, labeling, promotion, manufacturing,
and testing of regulated products.”).
41
See ROBIN FELDMAN & EVAN FRONDORF, DRUG WARS: HOW BIG PHARMA
RAISES PRICES AND KEEPS GENERICS OFF THE MARKET 34 (2017) (outlining the
basic contours of pay-for-delay settlements).
42
See, e.g., California Cartwright Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700–16758
(1907) (barring price-fixing and market-allocation agreements among
competitors by way of a more detailed list of transgressions than the Sherman
Act's general prohibitions against "restraints of trade;” allowing purchasers to sue
and recover “regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly
with the defendant” whereas federal antitrust law does not allow recovery by an
indirect purchaser);California Unfair Practices Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§
17000–17101 (1941) (allowing suits by private parties to be brought in the state
courts; prohibiting sales below cost undertaken with a purpose to injure
competitors, price discrimination between different localities undertaken with an
intent to injure competitors, and secret rebates given to some purchasers but not
to others and that are injurious to competition; unlike its federal counterpart, the
Robinson-Patman Act, the California Unfair Practices Act is not limited to price
discrimination on commodities but also extends to services and intangibles and
may include intellectual property.).
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pharmacy standards and requirements; these rules govern issues
such as compounding, manufacturing, enforcement, licensing, and
transparency.43
It is important to note that while government at both the federal and
state levels plays a crucial role, government cannot be expected to
do everything. As described below, intellectual property theory rests
against a backdrop of faith in the importance of competition and the
efficiency of open markets. 44 Despite extensive regulation in the
health care system, society continues to depend on fair, open, and
competitive markets—markets that cannot function effectively
without a sufficient flow of information. Moreover, in the increasing
complexity of modern society, other actors play important roles in
fostering the flow of information that allows government regulators
to respond to market imperfection and manipulation, as well as
shining light on areas of the market that may be ripe for competition
and disruption. In short, an efficient and well-functioning
pharmaceutical market thrives on the sunlight of information; it
would wither in the dark.
Public outcry over rising prices in the United States, particularly in
contrast to comparable countries across the globe, has prompted
numerous legislative and regulatory attempts to reform the system.
More than 40 states have introduced legislation to address rising
pharmaceutical pricing, with many of those bills directed at
transparency in drug pricing. Transparency has been an issue for
Congress and federal regulators as well, with the introduction of
transparency bills and regulations.45

43

See State Regulation of Compounding Pharmacies, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(Oct.
1,
2014),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/health/regulating-compounding-pharmacies.aspx;
SUMEET SINGH & SAMUEL M. SMITH, DEFINITIVE GUIDE TO STATE REGULATION
OF THE PHARMACEUTICAL SUPPLY CHAIN 3 (Five Rivers RX 2018).
44
See infra text accompanying notes 182–187.
45
E.g., Drug Price Transparency Act, H.R. 2087, 116th Cong. (2019);
Prescription Drug Price Transparency Act, H.R. 1035, 116th Cong. (2019); see
also Patient Right to Know Drug Prices Act, S. 2554, 115th Cong. (2018)
(enacted) (prohibiting gag clauses, which were contractual clauses that prevented
pharmacists from letting patients know that it would be cheaper to pay for a drug
out-of-pocket); 84 Fed. Reg. 2340–2363 (Feb. 6, 2019) (proposed rebate rule later
withdrawn that also would have required that PBMs disclose to their clients (the
insurance plans) the services rendered to each drug company they negotiated with
on behalf of the insurance plan); see also Merck & Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Servs., No. 19-cv-01738 (APM), 2019 WL 2931591 (D.D.C. July 8,
2019) (overturning Health and Human Services regulation requiring that drug
companies include list prices in their advertisements; overturned on the grounds
that the agency lacked Congressional authority for the regulation).
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As state actors have sought to regulate or even investigate
pharmaceutical pricing and practices, they have run into claims of
trade secrecy. For example, Caremark is one of three major
Pharmacy Benefit Managers that control 85% of the market. When
the State of Ohio investigated in 2018 how PBMs spent state and
federal funds, a third party prepared a report for the state which
included details of such spending. Caremark then objected to
publication of the report, filed a lawsuit seeking to suppress the
report. In shrill language, the Pharmacy Benefit Manager argued
that pricing information regarding prescription drugs in its contracts
with entities that manage Medicaid for patients constituted
“proprietary” “trade secrets,” such that publication would be
“devastating,” with “severe financial harm” to its business.46 Trying
to have it both ways, Caremark represented that the report it did not
want the public to read found that “allegations against Caremark
were not true” with respect to “preferential pricing.”47 Along the
same lines, a California court enjoined the state from publishing
information about a pharmaceutical company’s planned drug price
increases before those prices would go into effect on the ground that
for purposes of the order, the information constituted trade secrets.48

46

See Complaint at ¶¶ 18, 25, 27–30, 38, 79–85, CaremarkPCS Health, LLC v.
Sears, No. 18-cv-5943 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. July 16, 2018) [Hereinafter, “Caremark
Complaint”]. The State of Ohio responded to Caremark’s request for temporary
injunctive relief to suppress publication by arguing that Caremark could not assert
trade secret projection because it failed to undertake reasonable security measures
regarding the information at issue. See Memorandum for Defendant Against
Plaintiff’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order, CaremarkPCS, No. 18-cv5943
(Ohio
Ct.
Com.
Pl.
2018),
<https://issuu.com/thecolumbusdispatch/docs/combinepdf__4_>. Although the
complaint focused on contracts between the Caremark PBM and various health
plans, it is possible that the material at issue included information about
agreements between the PBM and pharmaceutical manufacturers. The complaint
refers ambiguously to “pricing structures, fees, and details about Caremark’s
bidding and contracting process” and to “contract, pricing, fee, and rebate
information.” See Caremark Complaint at ¶¶ 46, 62. Those terms could refer
solely to Caremark’s bidding and contracting with its PBM clients; alternatively,
they could include bidding and contracting with suppliers such as pharmaceutical
manufacturers. The judge granted the temporary injunction, and the case is
pending (scheduled for trial March 9, 2020).
47
See Caremark Complaint at ¶ 61.
48
See Order Granting Petitioner Amgen Inc.’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction, Amgen Inc. v. Cal. Corr. Health Serv., No. 18-stcp-03147 (Cal. Super.
Ct. Mar. 11, 2019). For a discussion of how California might structure its
transparency regulations to avoid a charge of trade secret misappropriation, see
Katherine L. Gudiksen, Samuel M. Chang & Jaime S. King, The Secret of Health
Care Prices: Why Transparency Is in the Public Interest, CAL. HEALTH CARE
FOUND. (July 16, 2019), https://www.chcf.org/publication/secret-health-careprices.
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Another assertion of trade secrecy arose in a Nevada case in 2017.
The state of Nevada passed a statute aiming at curtailing rising
diabetes drug prices requiring manufacturers and Pharmacy Benefit
Managers to disclose cost and pricing information for diabetes drugs
to the state, with some information to be publicly available. In
response, the pharmaceutical industry trade association, known by
the acronym “PhRMA,” sought injunctive relief to prevent
implementation of the statute. The industry made stark predictions
that the statute “undermin[es] innovation and competition in the
American pharmaceutical industry,” “violates the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment” by depriving affected manufacturers of tradesecret protection,” and “strips pharmaceutical manufacturers of
trade secret protection for confidential, completely sensitive,
proprietary information regarding the production, cost, pricing,
marketing, and advertising of their patented diabetes medicines.”49
To support those arguments, a group of pharmaceutical executives
filed separate affidavits duly repeating that the “factors considered
in setting and adjusting the prices of our products and the percentage
of our profits that derive from diabetes drugs are confidential and
proprietary,” and that “[o]ur customers and competitors would gain
a competitive advantage over [each company] if they were to obtain”
such information,50 and thus the companies would be endangered
should the State of Nevada require disclosure of pricing information
for diabetes treatments. The affidavits contained almost verbatim
language.
These court submissions by the industry beg the question of whether
one can make something a trade secret simply by repeatedly, and
aggressively asserting, that it is so, when no specific legislative
enactment (as of yet) precludes taking such a position. Thankfully,
trade secret law has long been aware of this “it is, because I say so”
problem. In the traditional context of employer/employee trade
secret litigation, companies sometimes have sought to establish
49

See Plaintiffs’ Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 1–2, 15–19, Pharm. Research and Mfrs. of Am. v. Sandoval, No.
2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 2017). The motion was denied, and
the plaintiffs ultimately voluntarily dismissed the case due to what was vaguely
portrayed as changed circumstances. See Order Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. Oct.
17, 2017), ECF No. 61; Plaintiffs’ Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal
Without Prejudice, Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. June 28,
2018), ECF No. 96.
50
See Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Declarations of C.
Marsh (Boehringer Ingelheim), S. Albers (Novo Nordisk), P. Davish (Merck), D.
Asay (Lilly), J. Borneman (Sanofi), Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D.
Nev. Sept. 13, 2017), ECF No. 26.

78

trade secrecy by pointing to broadly-worded employment
agreements which declare, in conclusory language, that a swath of
the company’s information and products constitute confidential
information. Courts have rejected such assertions. Whether an item
of information meets the objective elements required to demonstrate
that a trade secret exists is not the same thing as whether the
company labeled something as a trade secret.51 Stating in a contract
that information is confidential may provide evidence that a
company employed security measures to protect potential trade
secrets. Protecting one’s information, however, is merely one aspect
of the test for trade secrecy, and it is by no means dispositive on its
own.52
II. EXPANDING ASSERTIONS OF TRADE SECRECY AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST
To set the stage for our discussion of trade secrecy and PBM pricing,
we start by placing trade secret law in its IP context. Trade secrets
are the broadest category of intellectual property law and encompass
the most diverse forms of information. That is so because a trade
secret can constitute many types of business information, and
because no formal registration or government approval is necessary
for rights to accrue. A claimant with a valid trade secret need only
establish secrecy, the use of reasonable security measures, and
economic value to others driven by secrecy.53
Although trade secret law differs significantly from patent law and
copyright law, it is more closely related to both than may commonly
be recognized. As to patent law, every patentable invention begins
its life upon conception and reduction to practice as a trade secret,
and it is only when the owner elects to file a patent application
(which will eventually be published) that trade secret rights make
51

See, e.g., Sun Media Sys., Inc. v. KDSM, LLC, 564 F. Supp. 2d 946, 964–965
(S.D. Iowa 2008) (“Plaintiff cannot, however, use the confidentiality clause in the
KDSM contract to turn items into trade secrets that simply are not trade secrets
under applicable law.”); JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 3.04 (2017) (“[O]ne
may not create a trade secret by merely characterizing something as such in a
contract.”).
52
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (one element of the test for trade secrecy is whether
“the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information
secret[.]”).
53
See id. (defining trade secrecy). Like almost all state versions of the Uniform
Act, the Federal Act has a four-element test: the item of information must not be
generally known to the relevant persons, it cannot be readily ascertainable, it must
have independent economic value to competitors as a result of secrecy, and it must
be the software of reasonable steps to secure confidentiality.
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way for patent rights. As to copyright law, some forms of
information— particularly software source code—can be the subject
of copyright protection and trade secret protection at the same time.
Copyright law protects the expression, while trade secret law
protects the ideas instantiated in code that meets the requirements of
trade secrecy. As a result, it would be a mistake to treat trade secret
law as a remote branch of intellectual property law, unconnected to
the public policy concerns that have been prevalent in the patent and
copyright literature for many years.
That said, trade secret law stands in particular contrast to patent law
in the pantheon of intellectual property rights. With patents, for
example, society allows suppression of competition for a limited
period of time in exchange for publicly disclosing the invention.54
The mighty patent packs a short but powerful punch. It blocks out
all competition, even from those who invent independently, for a
shorter period of time and only in exchange for sharing the
information with society at large. With trade secret, however, there
is no quid pro quo to society of disclosure of the invention; and the
secret potentially can last forever. And in contrast to patent law, a
competitor company that creates the same thing independently can
use it freely under trade secret law.55 With this fundamental tenet,
trade secret strays far from the notion of providing the possibility of
a monopoly,56 and as a result, trade secret is not designed to suppress
competition in the same manner as patent. Moreover, once enough
people in the given industry or market know the secret, or even
reasonably could ascertain it with a minimum of time and labor,
protection ends. Thus, trade secret is far less focused on allowing
the suppression of competition with an iron fist than the more
familiar patent law context. Trade secret law instead primarily
focuses on those in privity with the putative rights-holder—those
who had access to the plaintiff’s intellectual property under a
confidentiality restriction. As with copyright,57 trade secret is less of
an all-powerful right. The potential for longer periods of protection
is balanced by the fact that such rights are subject to many more

54

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (noting that independent development, which
means developing the same or similar information as another’s trade secret
through independent effort, is not “improper means” and thus does not constitute
trade secret misappropriation).
56
For a discussion of the fact that patent law provides an opportunity for a
monopoly, rather than an assurance of a monopoly, see ROBIN FELDMAN,
RETHINKING PATENT LAW 23–39 (2012).
57
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 160–171 (discussing fair use exception
to copyright).
55
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exceptions reflecting contexts in which other societal interests are at
play.
The fact that a company would suffer competitive harm if
information were released does not mean, in and of itself, that
release of the information would implicate trade secret rights. That
distinction is critically important in trade secret law. For example, if
an employee quits, starts a competing business, and uses his or her
general skills, knowledge, and training gained from that job to
attract the former employer’s customers and thereby harm the
former employer, that harm is not evidence that the employer had
trade secrets, or that the employee misused trade secrets. While the
former employer suffered competitive harm, the information the
former employee used to inflict that harm—skills, knowledge, and
training that do not constitute trade secrets58—is not something that
can be propertized, nor is the harm something for which one can
seek legal redress. Similarly, that a pharmaceutical manufacturer
might suffer harm if pricing information were disclosed does not, in
and of itself, serve to establish an intellectual property right.
And of course, the basis of this analysis rings true throughout
intellectual property law. Suffering competitive harm does not
establish that intellectual property exists. Rather, the establishment
of the intellectual property right must come first. The fact that
competitors could beat a company is generally a cause for
celebration in a competitive economy, rather than a legal cause of
action. Intellectual property rights are limited exceptions to that
general rule. And in the utilitarian context of United States
intellectual property law, those rights are granted for the purpose of
advancing society as a whole, not the individual creator. Despite
strains of moral rights theory in the intellectual property traditions
of nations such as France, the United States’ intellectual property
regime remains unabashedly utilitarian.59
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See generally Kurt M. Saunders & Nina Golden, Skill or Secret? – The Line
Between Trade Secrets and Employee General Skills and Knowledge, 15 N.Y.U.
J. L. & BUS. 61 (2018) (analyzing factors courts have used over the years to
separate protectable trade secrets from unprotectable general skills, knowledge,
training, and experience).
59
Although certain treaty obligations give a nod to French notions of moral rights
that ground in some areas of intellectual property, the U.S. intellectual property
legal tradition remains firmly rooted in utilitarianism. For a discussion of these
issues, although with a more general discussion of utilitarianism and
consequentialism, see FELDMAN, supra note 56, at 76–79 (citing Graham v. John
Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) for the proposition that “[t]he patent monopoly was
not designed to secure the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather, it
was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge”).

81

These foundations, therefore, provide the underpinning of trade
secret law. Despite these moorings, trade secret law faces real risk
that it will be pulled in overreaching directions, a problem
exemplified by the case of the regulatory disclosure debates. And
indeed, the problem addressed in this Article is just one instance of
a wider issue: increasingly, companies are attempting to assert trade
secrecy claims outside the commonplace civil litigation context in
order to block regulatory oversight or public inquiry into potentially
unsavory business practices. To what degree can trade secret claims
be asserted to shield such practices, weighed against harm to
consumers, patients, voters, government agencies, and others? This
discussion should not occur in isolation—that is, it cannot be
focused solely on pharmaceutical pricing information in PBM
agreements. Rather, the pharmaceutical pricing debates reveal
emerging doctrinal and theoretical tensions, and resolution of the
issue can provide overarching theoretical points of value for more
widespread concerns regarding overbroad, overreaching assertions
of trade secrecy rights.
Although overbroad trade secrecy assertions are not new, the
problem now extends far beyond traditional civil litigation disputes
between former employers and departing employees—the
customary domain of trade secret law. Recent scholarship has
highlighted problems in a variety of doctrinal arenas including that
trade secrecy claims have been raised to block criminal defendants
from examining the technologies used to convict them 60 and the
need to protect whistleblowers from assertions of
misappropriation.61 In a similar vein, companies have claimed that
data about the ethnicity and gender of their workforce is corporate
intellectual property, 62 there is a risk that medical device
60

See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in
the Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018) (magisterial
commentary describing many ways in which technologies used by the prosecution
are withheld from defense counsel based on trade secrecy blocking tactics asserted
as an evidentiary privilege).
61
See Peter Menell, Tailoring a Public Policy Exception to Trade Secret
Protection, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2017) (describing an immunity for certain
methods of whistleblowing adopted by Congress from the author for the Defend
Trade Secrets Act); Peter Menell, The Defend Trade Secrets Act Whistleblower
Immunity Provision: A Legislative History, 1 BUS., ENT. & TAX L. REV. 398
(2017) (same).
62
See Jamillah Bowman Williams, Why Companies Shouldn’t Be Allowed to
Treat Their Diversity Numbers as Trade Secrets, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 15,
2019),
https://hbr.org/2019/02/why-companies-shouldnt-be-allowed-to-treattheir-diversity-numbers-as-trade-secrets (describing public policy reasons why
diversity data should be made available, noting that the “tactic” of asserting trade
secrecy “seems to be aimed more at avoiding bad publicity than remaining
competitive”); Jamillah Bowman Williams, Diversity as a Trade Secret, 107 GEO.
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manufacturers may claim trade secret rights in data collected from
patients implanted with such devices,63 and government actors and
suppliers have claimed trade secrets in source code used for
“automated decisionmaking” and public infrastructure, creating the
potential to insulate public-decisions making from the normal
scrutiny of a democratic process. 64 These problems highlight the
risks of an extraordinary expansion of trade secret claims, and the
resulting tensions for doctrinal analysis, theoretical consistency, and
public policy. And as trade secret issues emerge in ever-expanding
contexts where the focus appears to be on a different set of issues
entirely, the temptation to glide swiftly over the underlying
intellectual property issues may be great. In those circumstances, the
logic and doctrinal consistency of trade secret can easily be trampled.
Such commentaries will doubtless increase in the years to come,
along with the rapid expansion of trade secret and related disputes
in our information-based economy. 65 In addressing the public
L.J. 1684 (2019) (sustained analysis of policy problems and threats to employee
mobility and opportunity when companies assert that employee diversity data
constitutes the company’s trade secrets, with models for potential resolution:
“[t]here is an inherent conflict between the values of trade secrecy doctrine and
the broader goals of equal opportunity.”).
63
See Elizabeth A. Rowe, Sharing Data, 104 IOWA L. REV. 288, 299 (2018)
(describing how manufacturers of implanted medical devices can seek to control
data obtained from patients under trade secret, copyright, and other legal theories).
64
See Sonia K. Katyal, The Paradox of Source Code Secrecy, 104 CORNELL L.
REV. 1183 (2019) (discussing how treatment of source code as a trade secret
creates negative ramifications for transparency when government entities use
software to automate decisions; proposing numerous solutions such as limited
access by specific reviewers and incentives for “open code initiatives”); David S.
Levine, The People’s Trade Secrets, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 61, 98–
100 (2018) (examining government bodies which themselves claim trade secret
rights in information ranging from school exams to—pertinent to this article—
prices paid by the U.S. Air Force to a military contractor); David S. Levine, The
Impact of Trade Secrecy on Public Transparency, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF
TRADE SECRECY (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011)
(describing how public sector infrastructure so often uses private technologies,
leading to trade secrecy assertions to inhibit public access; describing voting
machines and breathalyzers as examples).
65
A timely example, as yet unexplored at a theoretical level, is the use of
confidentiality agreements in settlements over allegations of sexual abuse and
harassment. See Elizabeth A. Harris, Despite #MeToo Glare, Efforts to Ban
Secret Settlements Stop Short, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/14/arts/metoo-movement-nda.html
(exploring legislative efforts, most prominently in New Jersey, to curtail the
practice of buying silence about sexual misconduct through confidentiality
agreements). As Lemley and Shapiro note, there are also many other areas in
which confidentiality claims may also be subject to critical analysis, such as patent
license terms agreed to by companies which have made FRAND (Fair,
Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory) commitments to a standards organization,
as well as efforts to prevent price comparisons by competitors. See Mark Lemley
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interest when weighed against corporate assertions of trade secrecy,
we should not address each problem by itself, without a broader
frame of reference. Rather, we should strive for approaches that
work for the consistent benefit of the public interest across the board.
Our Article aims for that goal.
III. TRADE SECRECY AND PRICING INFORMATION: CIVIL
LITIGATION, REGULATORY DISCLOSURE, AND PROSPECTS FOR
REFORM
As discussed above, trade secret law is a broad category of
intellectual property law, and one without the registration or
examination processes seen in copyright and patent law—processes
which tend to constrain what can be asserted as potentially
protectable. Thus, there is a real risk that an already-broad doctrine
can be stretched even further, at risk to the public interest.
Claiming price, rebate, and profit margin information as a trade
secret—especially in the narrow and highly-regulated context in
which PBMs operate—seems curious, even on a visceral level. First,
this sort of information hardly sounds like intellectual property. It
is not an idea, and it certainly is not the product of innovation. The
pricing in a PBM agreement is not information developed by a
company to operate its business. Rather, it is a mere deal point
negotiated between two entities. Second, the very targets of
regulation—artificially inflated prices—are claimed as intellectual
property to avoid disclosure. Thus, trade secret law is being asserted
as an offensive weapon to avoid regulation, and to avoid
responsibility for the public harm created by the supposed “trade
secret” itself. That, in itself, should raise initial suspicion, given the
distance between these goals and the notion of allowing a business
to protect the fruits of ideas and innovations cabined under limiting
definitions while carrying on its business functions.
It sounds curious because this is not what the policies underlying
trade secret law are about. Certainly, litigants claim financial
information as a trade secret, and companies submit information to
state and federal regulators under seal. But price competition is
quite often open, not hidden—not something traditionally seen as
“property” that is off-limits to competitors.
In fact, the notion that the mere price of something is a secret might
come as a surprise to some who have focused on the need to offer
& Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable Royalties for StandardEssential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1141-45 (2013).
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competitive pricing in a well-working market. As the Fifth Circuit
commented in 1970, in the context of noting that one should not
define industrial espionage too broadly, “for our industrial process
to remain healthy, there must be breathing room for observing a
competing industrialist. A competitor can and must shop his
competition for pricing and examine his products. . . .”66
Perhaps because the concept sounds so discordant, few appear to
have even asked the question: is cost or pricing information alone,
without details necessary to ascertain the underlying formulas or
manufacturing process information, really a trade secret? Even if it
were, would it really be the type of trade secret that creates a barrier
to regulatory disclosure that serves a strong public interest? Yet
sweeping past that question avoids issues at the core of trade secret
jurisprudence. The following section will examine the issue in the
context of legislative and judicial precedent in trade secret law.
A. Pricing Information and Trade Secret Law: Case Law in
Civil Litigation
Although many cases in civil lawsuits have addressed trade secrecy
claims over various types of pricing information, none appear to
have squarely posed the methodological question of whether pricing
information (in general, or as to specific industries or types of
transactions) is the type of thing that should receive trade secret
protection.
On the surface, the elements of proving that a trade secret exists in
civil litigation are straightforward, but general: the information
cannot be generally known to others who could use it, it must be
secured with reasonable restrictions, it must have economic value to
competitors as a result of being secrecy, and it cannot be readily
66

See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.
1970). In a variation of the argument, some companies assert that trade secret law
protects prices because prices give the company an advantage over customers,
rather than competitors. The assertion is that preventing one customer from
knowing what another customer has paid gives the company an economic
advantage over customer. See Caremark Complaint at ¶ 37 (claiming that
disclosure of the information “would give Caremark’s potential customers an
advantage over Caremark in subsequent contract negotiations); see also
Annemarie Bridy, Trade Secret Prices and High-Tech Devices: How Medical
Device Manufacturers Are Seeking to Sustain Profits by Propertizing Prices, 17
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 187, 192 (2009) (describing statements by Guidant
company spokesperson in the context of medical device litigation and
commenting that Guidant’s theory “if ultimately accepted by courts, could have
profound implications not only for the health care market . . . but for every market
in which the prices paid for goods are subject to contractual negotiations between
sellers and buyers.”).
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ascertainable in the sense that it can easily be cobbled together
within a minimum of time and effort (apart from California, where
ready ascertainability is a defense to a trade secret claim, not an
affirmative element to establish a valid claim).67 Astute readers will
notice that these four elements largely ask the same question, albeit
in different forms.
Under that general rubric—as well as under the pre-UTSA, sixfactor test from the 1939 Restatement of Torts that is obsolete
everywhere today except New York—courts have sometimes
treated pricing information as a trade secret, albeit without
theoretical analysis,68 and sometimes rejected such claims. Where
courts have denied claims that pricing information constituted trade
secrets, the rulings often turn on factual issues, such as whether the
information at issue is available from the other side of the
transaction, or whether it is otherwise available in the given market
or industry.69 For example, a Kansas case rejected a trade secret
67

See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A–B).
E.g., Freedom Med. Inc. v. Whitman, 343 F. Supp. 3d 509, 520 (E.D. Pa. 2018)
(granting preliminary injunction in part against former employee and finding that
while “pure pricing information is not protectable because that information is
known to the consumer,” pricing formulae derived from a range of data such as
materials, labor, overhead, and profit, are protectable as combination or
compilation secrets because that “full compilation of pricing information is not
available from public sources”); MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F.
Supp. 2d 396, 423–24 (E.D. Va. 2004) (split ruling finding in favor of former
employee against former employees on trade secret claim; finding that a document
containing a “schedule of discounts” was a trade secret where it was not a
“standard price list” and was instead an internal document used “to develop price
quotes for customers”); Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1455
(2002) (finding that “cost and pricing information”—“pricing, profit margins,
costs of production, pricing concessions, promotional discounts, advertising
allowances, volume rebates, marketing concessions, payment terms, and rebate
incentives”— qualified as trade secrets and not generalized industry information
because it was “unique” to the former employer); Frantz v. Johnson, 999 P.2d
351, 359 (Nev. 2000) (affirming misappropriation finding against former
employee and others; although “not every customer and pricing list will be
protected as a trade secret,” the “customer and pricing information” at issue was
“extremely confidential, its secrecy was guarded, and it was not readily available
to others” given the highly specialized nature of the industry); Sigma Chem. Co.
v. Harris, 794 F.2d 371, 373–74 (8th Cir, 1986) (affirming judgment enforcing
non-competition covenant against former employee where, among other things,
“price” information “was not in the public domain”); SI Handling Sys., Inc. v.
Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1257, 1260 (8th Cir. 1985) (vacating preliminary
injunction against former employee; affirming some but not all findings of trade
secrecy; rejecting notion that prices of plaintiff’s merchandise constituted trade
secrets because suppliers “have every incentive” to disclose it “to their
customers,” but finding that pricing information that “subsumed” items “relating
to materials, labor, overhead, and profit margin” was protectable).
69
E.g., CDC Restoration & Constr., LC v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 274
P.3d 317, 324 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) (affirming fact-based finding, in lawsuit
68
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claim in pricing information where buyers were able to freely share
information about how much they paid for services from the seller.70
against former employees, that pricing information was not a trade secret because
the plaintiff failed to show that the information was “unique or especially
inventive, such that it could not be readily duplicated by others in the industry.”);
Progressive Prod., Inc. v. Schwartz, 258 P.3d 969, 978 (Kan. 2011) (affirming
finding that pricing information was not a trade secret, in lawsuit against former
employees, where facts showed that customers could freely communication “with
each other about how much they were paying for certain work.”); Stenstrom
Petroleum Serv. Grp., Inc. v. Mesch, 874 N.E.2d 959, 974 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (in
lawsuit against former employee, denying motion for preliminary injunction
where former employer claimed pricing information such as a profit margin was
a trade secret where former employee showed that a pricing spreadsheet could be
reproduced in mere hours as calculations of costs, labor, and the price of materials:
“[i]n order to prove that a pricing formula constitutes a trade secret, a plaintiff
must establish that the value of the pricing formula lies in the fact that it is not
generally known to others who could benefit by using it or that it could not be
acquired through general skills and knowledge.”); Custard Ins. Adjusters, Inc. v.
Nardi, No. CV980061967S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1003, *139 (Apr. 20,
2000) (issuing injunction against former employee to enforce non-competition
covenant but rejecting trade secret allegation; “pricing information” can qualify
for trade secret protection, but whether that is so depends on facts; where
plaintiff’s witness testified that pricing is “important and highly confidential,”
court asked “[b]ut why is this so? In this highly competitive industry why would
not pricing information be readily available from prospective customers? One
would think they would be falling over each other letting the adjustment
companies know the pricing of competitors to get the best deal for
themselves[.]”); Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Brantjes, 891 F. Supp. 432,
439 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (denying motion for preliminary injunction against former
shareholder where, among other things, the factual context showed that a price
list was not a trade secret where the price information at issue was widely shared);
Nat’l Risk Mgmt., Inc. v. Bramwell, 819 F. Supp. 417, 432 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(entering post-trial judgment against plaintiffs on trade secret claim where it
asserted that a flat 25% discount figure, and funding details on how to meet that
number, were not protectable trade secrets, finding that how the 25% number was
“first determined” would be of “no value” to others, and that the other information
was “freely given out to prospective clients.”); Optic Graphics, Inc. v. Agee, 591
A.2d 578, 586 (Md. 1991) (while pricing information can be protectable as a trade
secret, affirming finding that such information as asserted against a former
employee was not a trade secret because, in context, it was “subject to change,”
“subject to market forces,” and “subject to the type of machinery” used and other
variables, and thus was not “meaningful”); Tyson Metal Prod., Inc. v. McCann,
546 A.2d 119, 121 (Pa. 1988) (reversing injunction where, among other things,
asserted trade secrets in compiled price list were not protectable because
competitors could “contact a mutual customer and ask why its bid was rejected in
favor of” the plaintiff); Agric. Labor Relations Bd. v. Richard A. Glass, Co., 175
Cal. App. 3d 703, 715 (1985) (in evidentiary dispute in labor relations proceeding,
reversing administrative ruling barring discovery; holding that party did not
sustain its burden of showing that cost and price information claimed as trade
secrets should be withheld from discovery, because the assertions were
“conclusory and unsupported by evidentiary data. There is no allegation that this
information is not a matter of common knowledge among the citrus growers or
readily obtainable on the open market.”)
70
See Schwartz, 258 P.3d at 978.
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And an Illinois court rejected such a claim where the profit margin
information at issue was easily reproducible.71
At the same time, albeit without much analysis, some courts also
appear to have questioned whether pricing information is properly
treated a trade secret.72 Leading treatises likewise indicate some
degree of hesitation, without specific focus on the questions raised
here.73
That courts in the midst of civil lawsuits have not spent much time
analyzing the question of whether pricing information should
constitute a trade secret is not a surprise. Trial courts tend to
consider the arguments that litigants raise, rather than to engage in
sua sponte analysis of theoretical issues. In lawsuits between
71

See Mesch, 874 N.E.2d at 974.
E.g., Advantor Sys. Corp. v. DRS Tech. Servs., 678 Fed. Appx. 839, 854 (11th
Cir. 2017) (affirming summary judgment for defense in part; claimed trade secret
in “lump-sum price quote” from a “subcontractor proposal” was not a trade secret
because it lacked independent economic value outside of its specific context of
being offered in a negotiation); Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Tech., LLC, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32371, *20 n.7 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 25, 2011) (granting defense
motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s generic descriptions of alleged
trade secrets; also finding that a profit margin was not something that could be a
trade secret); Square D Co. v. Van Handel, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21480, *23
(E.D. Wis. Aug. 25, 2005) (in a lawsuit against a former employee, finding that
under Wisconsin law “it is unlikely that a company’s pricing information will be
found entitled to trade secret protection except in extraordinary cases”; noting that
customers are free to disclose such information for to foster competition among
suppliers, and finding that treating price information as a trade secret would
amount to a virtual non-competition covenant restricting sales employees who
join a competing firm: “Price lists are not, as a matter of law, protected as trade
secrets.”); IKON Office Sols., Inc. v. Am. Office Prods., Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d
1154, 1169–1170 (D. Or. 2001) (granting summary judgment to former
employees on trade secret claim that included conclusory allegation that “pricing
information” was a trade secret; court expressed a concern that claiming general
business information as trade secrets could lead to the equivalent of a permanent
non-competition covenant); Amarr Co., Inc. v. Depew, 1996 Tenn. App. LEXIS
660, at *17 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1996) (reversing judgment against former
employee; in factual context where “price lists were readily available to any
purchaser who was comparing prices between competitors, and the price lists
were tracked by all competitors,” the court noted that “[w]e also do not see how
a profit and loss statement can be a ‘trade secret’ that gives an unfair advantage.”).
73
See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 4.02[2], 4–14 & n.17 (“Pricing information
may include historical cost data used in formulating bids . . . . However, it is the
data that is protectable; typically methods of pricing and estimating are not.”);
ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.09[8][b] (2018) (as to cost
and pricing, “[a]lthough there are somewhat more cases recognizing that such
information may constitute a trade secret, there are also a substantial number of
cases that decide the other way. This does not imply that authority is divided.
Rather, it simply suggests that facts presented in some cases have been sufficiently
secret to permit relief and, in other cases, not.”).
72
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companies, litigators may be unlikely to tackle that sort of question,
either because it is too complex and risky when a fact-based defense
may suffice, or because law firms may be loath to take positions that
corporate clients may oppose. Moreover, the type of public interest
at stake in regulatory disclosure cases is generally not at issue in a
civil lawsuit, so that absent factor does not spur a more
thoroughgoing approach. Moreover, only a few such cases reached
appellate or state supreme courts, and it does not appear that litigants
in such courts presented more theoretical questions for review. Thus,
the question is ripe for the type of in-depth theoretical analysis that
appellate courts can provide when fully presented with the issue.
B. Case Law in Government Disclosure Cases under FOIA and
the Trade Secrets Act
An entirely different body of case law has involved allegations that
pricing information constitutes protectable information. Once again,
the decisions yield mixed results. However, this body of law does
not focus on whether pricing is, in fact, a trade secret in the manner
defined by the Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts, because it
centers on a different statute with older language.
This line of cases comes from efforts by litigants to use the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) and the related Trade Secrets Act74 to
obtain information about bid pricing and contract pricing between
private companies and government entities—or to block its
release. 75 In some cases, disappointed bidders or would-be
competitors are the parties seeking the disclosure of such
information.
As noted, this is a different statute, and a different context, than is
seen in disputes between state regulators and industry where the
definition of a trade secret is governed by the Federal Act and the
state Uniform Trade Secret Act. We offer this case law and
literature review concerning disputes over pricing information under
74

The Trade Secrets Act is not the DTSA, but an older, narrower federal statute
governing release of information somewhat akin to the FOIA, but also with civil
penalties and imprisonment as potential penalties for government employees who
engage in unauthorized release of trade secrets. See 18 U.S.C. § 1905.
75
On the general subject of adjudicating potential government disclosures of
trade secrets through FOIA and other types of publication, the most thorough
treatment is Elizabeth Rowe, Striking a Balance: When Should Trade-Secret Law
Shield Disclosures to the Government?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 791, 794 (2011)
(focusing on “refusal to submit” situations where companies avoid submission of
data to government entities, outlining various federal statutes and agencies in play,
and advocating an approach analogous to the discovery of trade secrets in civil,
non-misappropriation lawsuits where a party seeks such evidence and faces
objections from the information-holder).
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the FOIA, however, because it is part of the historical backdrop, and
because it further demonstrates the inconsistent ways courts have
analyzed pricing information. This discussion comes with a major
caveat: The FOIA is an older, 1960s-era statute and its text refers
to both “trade secrets” and “confidential” information. Courts
considering FOIA actions have focused on the latter in rulings on
pricing information. However, that language is inconsistent with the
contemporary UTSA/DTSA framework, which does not envision a
two-tier regime of “trade secret” and “confidential” business
information. It is also confusing given recent debates in the civil
litigation context, discussed in detail below, regarding Uniform
Trade Secrets Act preemption of state law tort claims said to protect
“confidential” information.
Thus, while conceptions of
“confidential” information are of dubious logical validity in current
theory and pose clear dangers to public policy in broader trade secret
contexts, that is nevertheless the statutory framework in which the
FOIA disputes over pricing information have been litigated. We
therefore do not offer the logic of FOIA decisions as a model for the
proposals we offer regarding naked price and trade secrecy in the
PBM pharmaceutical pricing arena. We merely present this history
for completeness, for potential analogies, and for its shortcomings.
Indeed, a reader of civil trade secret disputes will immediately
notice a major difference between this FOIA line of cases addressing
statutory language from 1966 about confidentiality and civil
litigation rulings which analyze whether a trade secret exists. For
several decades, and until a June 2019 Supreme Court ruling altered
the analysis, courts evaluating potential FOIA disclosures applied
the following two-part test: information an entity is required to
submit to the government “will be considered confidential only if
disclosure would be likely either (1) to impair the government’s
ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause
substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from
whom the information was obtained.”76 As discussed below, many
FOIA rulings focused entirely on the second factor. Under neither
factor is a reviewing court tasked with focusing on whether any
given item of information is, in fact, a trade secret. Indeed, as
discussed, below, even the recent Supreme Court ruling was not
confronted with that question and did not approach it.
As we will describe below, these cases demonstrate that, in a
potentially analogous regulatory disclosure context, courts have
76

E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303, 304-05 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (applying 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) and stating that FOIA does not apply to
“trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged or confidential.”).
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avoided a full-on analysis of whether pricing information, in context,
truly constitutes a trade secret, in large part because they focus on
different statutory text and not the definition of a trade secret for
FOIA purposes. Indeed, compared to civil trade secret litigation,
these cases have mostly avoided any analysis of trade secrecy from
an intellectual property perspective, and have instead rendered
rulings based on how strong the contractor’s arguments are
regarding the competitive harm it would suffer should the pricing
information be publicly disclosed. That focus substantially
increases the chance that a court denies disclosure, without
separating harm that results from a loss of valid intellectual property
from the harm that occurs naturally in the business world as rivals
use unprotectable information to compete with one another.
Two studies have shown that courts reviewing such requests have,
in part, shifted ground towards nondisclosure. In a comprehensive
2002 article, Gregory McClure demonstrated that, in the 1980s and
90s, courts generally leaned toward disclosure of such pricing
information, 77 with one court notably stating that “the idea that a
price charged to the government for specific goods or services could
be a ‘trade secret’ appears passing strange to us[.]”78 In particular,
the D.C. and Ninth Circuits have issued rulings permitting the
release of pricing information over objections from companies
which had won bids or contracts. 79 In one 1997 decision, for
77

See Gregory H. McClure, The Treatment of Contract Prices Under the Trade
Secrets Act and the Freedom of Information Act Exemption 4: Are Contract
Prices Really Trade Secrets?, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 185, 196–216 (2002)
(comprehensive article collecting case law and advocating disclosure of pricing
information; “[t]he vast majority of cases have held that unit prices are releasable,
whether under the trade secret or competitive harm tests[.]).
78
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(remanding to trial court to require further information from the Air Force
regarding a pricing disclosure sought under the FOIA).
79
E.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Dalton, 974 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1997)
(granting motion for summary judgment by the Navy to release information from
military contracts that included allegedly confidential “cost and fee information,
including material, labor, and overhead costs, as well as target costs, target profits,
and fixed fees,” and other unit pricing data; rejecting contractor’s argument that
it would suffer competitive harm, because the contractor will continue bidding for
future contracts; “[contractor] might prefer that less be known about its
operations, and that the reasons for its operations for it past successes remain a
mystery to be solved by the competitors on their own. But it has not shown [Navy]
or this Court, on the basis of this record, that it will in fact be unable to duplicate
those successes unless [Navy] acquiesces in keeping the competition in the
dark.”); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir.
1994) (reversing agency and requiring release of “percentage and dollar amounts”
paid to government subcontractors, reasoning that “we believe the FOIA’s strong
presumption in favor of disclosure trumps the contractors’ right to privacy. Those
seeking to prevent the disclosure of certain information under FOIA have the
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example, the district court for the District of Columbia sharply
criticized the motion that a military contractor should be able to
withhold pricing information from its competitors: “[contractor]
might prefer that less be known about its operations, and that the
reasons for its past successes remain a mystery to be solved by the
competitors on their own. But it has not shown [the Navy] or this
Court, on the basis of this record, that it will in fact be unable to
duplicate those successes unless [the Navy] acquiesces in keeping
the competition in the dark.”80
However, these decisions did not directly analyze whether the
pricing information at issue was, in fact, a trade secret, and largely
did not attempt to define the meaning of confidentiality under the
FOIA either. Following the FOIA two-part test described above,
they instead focused on the distinct question of whether disclosure
of the information at issue would harm the party opposing
publication in marketplace competition. 81 As discussed further
below, whether information is intellectual property and whether a
party will suffer harm from competitors are not the same thing.
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit began shielding pricing information
from public disclosure in some decisions by the 1990s.82 Indeed, as
burden of proving that the information is confidential. It is questionable whether
the declarations submitted by the three contractors show any potential for
competitive harm, let alone substantial harm.”) (emphasis in original); Pacific
Architects & Eng., Inc. v. United States, 906 F.2d 1345, 1347–48 (9th Cir. 1990)
(affirming ruling to release a contract to provide maintenance services to the
government, which included a “unit rate price,” on the theory that a competitor
would not be able to figure out the profit margin given the “number of fluctuating
variables” that go into such a calculation); Brownstein Zeidman & Schomer v.
Dep’t of the Air Force, 781 F. Supp. 31, 32–33 (D.D.C. 1991) (in mixed ruling,
requiring release of “modified unit prices” in contract between AT&T and the Air
Force where “multiplier” information would be hard to ascertain without knowing
“a great deal about labor costs,” and thus fears of harm were too “speculative”);
see also Acumenics Research & Tech. v. United States, 843 F.2d 800, 807–08
(4th Cir. 1988) (finding that FOIA and Trade Secrets Act are “coextensive” as to
exemptions allowing disclosure and, in case where party sought release of pricing
information relating to a government contract, affirming release on ground that
“there are too many unascertainable variables in the unit price calculation” for a
competitor to figure out the contractor’s “multiplier,” and thus competitive harm
was not established); J.H. Lawrence Co. v. Smith, 545 F. Supp. 421, 424–25 (D.
Md. 1982) (finding triable fact issues as to whether unit pricing information with
NASA should be disclosed under FOIA and the Trade Secrets Act; denying
motion for summary judgment aiming to block such disclosure because
contracting party had not established competitive harm; “[t]he item prices does
not actually reveal the plaintiff’s underlying profit or overhead data.”).
80
See Martin Marietta Corp., 974 F. Supp. at 40.
81
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
82
E.g., MCI Worldcom, Inc. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 163 F. Supp. 2d 28, 35–36
(D.D.C. 2001) (granting contractor’s motion for summary judgment to block
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David Allen Dulaney has shown, that Circuit shifted strongly away
from such disclosures in the wake of in a 2003 decision, McDonnell
Douglas Corporation v. United States Department of the Air
Force.83 In that case, the D.C Circuit reversed a trial court decision
to allow publication of option year pricing and vendor pricing
information, though it permitted disclosure of information about
labor rates.84 It rejected several arguments from the Air Force in
favor of publication—namely, that the actual, adjusted prices would
not be released, making it harder for competitors to underbid, and
that factors other than price play into contracting decisions.85 The
court accepted the premise that the contractor would suffer
substantial competitive harm if such information were released, in
that the threat of being underbid constituted such harm.86 Again,
however, the court did not squarely address whether such pricing
information constituted a trade secret. Other, similar decisions
followed.87 That failure glossed over a serious analytical deficit. As
disclosure of pricing data for the remaining years of telecommunications services
contracts; “this Circuit has held that line-item pricing...is exactly the type of
information that constitutes ‘confidential commercial or financial information’
and is not disclosable in response to a FOIA request”; contractor showed
competitive harm by arguing that disclosure would lead to underbidding in the
future); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NASA, 180 F.3d 303, 306–07 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (reversing district court decision to release line item pricing information in
contract because agency was “illogical” in denying contractor’s competitive harm
argument; finding that agency’s reasoning was “silly” and “illogical” in asserting
that release of such information would not lead to underbidding as price is only
one factor, and that the real competitive harm was to other bidders who lack such
information); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. O’Leary, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2586, *13–15 (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 1999) (remanding Department of Energy’s
decision to release unit pricing information where agency’s “factfinding and
analysis appear to be wanting” as to potential competitive harm to be suffered by
contractor, which submitted evidence alleging that a competitor would receive
“an unfair advance look” before the next “rebid”).
83
375 F.3d 1182 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also David Allen Dulaney, Where’s the
Harm? Release Unit Prices in Awarded Contracts Under the Freedom of
Information Act, 2010 ARMY LAW. 37, 37–38 (2010) (“[O]ver the last decade,
government-friendly decisions by the Court of Appeal for the District of
Columbia . . . have virtually ensured that taxpayers cannot find out the amount the
government is paying for an individual unit of good or service”; arguing that
disclosure serves the public interest and contrasting these cases with a more open
process in the United Kingdom).
84
See McDonnell Douglas, 375 F.3d at 1187–90.
85
See id. at 1188–90.
86
See id.
87
E.g., Canadian Comm. Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 514 F.3d 37, 41–42
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming trial court ruling barring release of line item pricing
information in military contract because disclosure would cause substantial
competitive harm to contractors; “[b]eyond a general paean to the benefits of
public disclosure, therefore, the Air Force has given us nary a reason to believe
pricing information that, if disclosed, would work a substantial competitive harm,
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noted in Section II above, trade secret is not a pure competition
suppressing vehicle. Thus, the simple fear of being underbid—
which translates into the fear of facing competition—is not
something trade secret protects against. One who is underbid in a
situation where the information used does not actually constitute a
trade secret has no recourse.
A June 2019 Supreme Court ruling altered the test for FOIA records
disclosures by eliminating the “substantial competitive harm” factor
we have criticized above. 88 However, the case did not concern
pricing information or the definition of a trade secret under the FOIA
exceptions, and the court was not presented with an opportunity to
define what types of information constitutes a trade secret for FOIA
purposes and did not endeavor to do so.89 Indeed, the case illustrates
how courts facing FOIA disputes fail to carefully analyze latent
questions about what is truly protectable and what is not.
In Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, journalists
sought access to annual food stamp redemption data on a pergrocery store basis over a period of several years. 90 A trade
association resisted disclosure, arguing that groceries would suffer
competitive harm if competitors knew the details of food stamp
redemptions, in that they purportedly would better know where to
locate new stores. 91 Ultimately, the court rejected the two-part
should nonetheless be categorically excluded from [FOIA] Exemption 4.”); Essex
Electro Eng., Inc. v. U.S. Sec’y of the Army, 686 F. Supp. 2d 91, 93–94 (D.D.C.
2010) (granting summary judgment in favor of the Army against disclosure of
unit prices in contract; even though contractor’s argument about future harm was
“highly speculative because unit prices are based on multiple factors,” that
sufficed to show substantial competitive harm); Morales v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9101, at *17 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2012) (granting
summary judgment in favor of government entity and against disclosure of option
year pricing information because such disclosure “would give competitors of the
present contractors leverage with which to persuade PBGC to open the contracts
for bidding or renegotiation with others rather than exercise its current option”).
88
See Food Mrktg. Inst. v. Argus Leader Media, 139 S. Ct. 2356 (2019).
89
It is important to stress that Argus did not address the meaning of “trade secret”
under the FOIA. In any event, as Sharon Sandeen has noted, Congress may need
to overhaul the statute, as it reflects language from 1966 that is outdated given the
DTSA’s definition of trade secrecy. See Sharon Sandeen, High Court FOIA
Ruling Has Trade Secrets Implications, LAW 360 (July 3, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1175163/high-court-foia-ruling-has-tradesecrets-implications (“But the need for greater clarity and certainty is not the only
reason Congress should provide a legislative fix. One is needed because a lot has
happened since 1966 concerning our conceptions of privacy and secrecy,
including the adoption of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, which provides
a definition of ‘trade secret’ that has become the international norm.”).
90
See Argus, 139 S. Ct. at 2361.
91
See id.
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FOIA test because its second element (substantial competitive harm)
was not rooted in the FOIA’s text.92 The Court instead focused on
whether the information at issue was confidential. In doing so, the
Court did not seek to define the term “trade secret” in the FOIA, and
did not treat the case as one involving intellectual property.
Somewhat oddly, the Court defined confidential information as that
which the owner customarily treats as private—without asking what
would happen if someone treated as private something that was
either publicly available, or otherwise did not meet the criteria for
trade secret protection.93 To be sure, the data at issue may well have
qualified for trade secret protection—none of the parties appear to
have analyzed that question—and questions of protectability thus
may await a dispute over more questionable types of information.
In any event, Argus Leader did nothing to clarify when information
qualifies as a “trade secret” for FOIA disputes and when it does not.
The ruling may well confuse such matters because it considered only
whether a party treated information as confidential, which is hardly
dispositive of protectability from an intellectual property standpoint.
This decision, as with our FOIA discussion overall, does not affect
our critique of naked price in trade secret disputes between state
regulators and industry under the Federal Act and state Uniform
Acts, because it deals exclusively with the FOIA’s older
“confidential” terminology and does not purport to address the
protection of pricing information under a contemporary trade secret
regime.
In open records disputes, the situation is similarly mixed in state
courts where open records statutes and regulatory disclosures are at
issue. Courts often rule against disclosure on the ground that pricing
information is a trade secret, but do not squarely address the
question. Many reach their ruling based on complaints by the
contractor that it will face price competition in the market if the
information were disclosed.94 Notably, however, in a case involving
92

See id. at 2365.
See id. at 2363-65.
94
E.g., State ex rel. Luken v. Corp. for Findlay Mkt. of Cincinnati, 988 N.E.2d
546, 551–52 (Ohio 2013) (Where party sought records filed with a government
agency that included rental rates in a market, court considered Uniform Act
factors and also described the six-factor Restatement test to find that the
information was a trade secret and thus not subject to disclosure; court considered
argument that disclosure would cause tenants to “compare notes” and thus cause
a “competitive disadvantage” but did not inquire whether such rates were the type
of thing that should be a trade secret in the first place); Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc.
v. Abbott, 406 S.W.3d 626, 629, 632 (Tex. App. 2013) (same, as to pricing
information in waste disposal records); Gannett River States Pub. Co. v. Entergy
Miss., Inc., 940 So.2d 221, 225–26 (Miss. 2006) (where publisher sought rate
information that a utility charged a third party for electrical services, affirming
93
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commodity rates, the North Dakota high court found that pricing
information constituted a trade secret, but nonetheless held that it
was subject to regulatory disclosure given the public interest at
stake—the “legitimate governmental interest of policing
irregularities in the handling of public matters affecting the rates
paid by citizens for an essential commodity in this state.”95
Even though the FOIA is a different regime and disputes under it
arise in a different context, these cases show us that, in a potentially
analogous regulatory disclosure context, courts here, too, have
avoided a full-on analysis of whether pricing information, in context,
is truly protectable information, much less a “trade secret” under the
FOIA exemptions. That type of analysis is deficient for the broader
questions about PBM pricing that we raise, for the simple reason
that suffering competitive harm does not establish that intellectual
property exists. As noted at the outset, for example, if an exemployee starts a competing business using general knowledge and
training to entice customers away, the former company may have
suffered competitive harm, but the information used to inflict that
harm cannot be propertized and does not constitute a trade secret.96
Similarly, if pricing information does not constitute a trade secret,
the harm a contracting party might suffer from regulatory disclosure
does not, in and of itself, establish that intellectual property rights
exist.97

nondisclosure where court treated evidence of harm as conclusive of
confidentiality; “Energy produced substantial, credible, and reasonable evidence
that disclosing the information . . . would compromise Energy’s ability to offer
competitive prices to other large users, cripple its ability to negotiate with existing
and new customers, and jeopardize Energy’s ability to use lucrative high-volume
user contracts to keep the rates of smaller users lower.”); Am. Family Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Mo. Dep’t of Ins., 169 S.W.3d 905, 910–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (where
public interest group sought disclosure of insurance premium information that had
been provided to government agency, affirming nondisclosure, applying
Restatement of Torts factors (but not Comment b) to find trade secrecy but
without directly asking if pricing information could be a trade secret; focusing on
idea that information had independent economic value and finding that
declarations about competitive harm should other insurers see the information and
“adjust their pricing to become more competitive”).
95
See N. States Power Co. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm., 502 N.W.2d 240, 247 (N.D.
1993) (affirming disclosure of price and volume data in natural gas contracts).
96
See supra note 58 (example of unprotectable employee general skill,
knowledge, and experience).
97
Absent some unlawful act like fraud, underbidding a business rival is not
wrongful. See generally Charles C. Chapman Bldg. Co. v. Cal. Mart, 2 Cal. App.
3d 846, 857 (1969) (collecting authorities; noting that “price reduction” is
“generally a lawful method of competition”). It is important to highlight that
many arguments seeking to treat prices as trade secrets are no more than an effort
to evade this longstanding principle.
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C. Is Naked Price Really a Trade Secret?
We now reach the question that courts in civil litigation and in FOIA
disputes have skirted or have not addressed at all: is pricing
information, especially in the context of agreements between major
Pharmacy Benefit Managers and pharmaceutical companies, a trade
secret in the first place, particularly when weighed against a strong
public interest?
To be sure, there is something awkward about claiming pricing
information—whether a raw price, a profit margin, or related
details—as one company’s intellectual property. In a market
economy, price competition is the norm. A competitor with a better
bid does not steal intellectual property from a rival that offers a
higher price, even if it consciously tries to underbid that price
point—it instead offers similar goods and services, presumably of
its own design, at a rate more desirable to the buyer. The buyer
makes the choice, not the seller, so the notion that the price belongs
to the seller seems off-base for that reason as well. And a price is
hardly the same thing as the underlying design, development, or
product being bought and sold—the information that is the normal
candidate for trade secret protection.
Indeed, the idea that pricing information should qualify for trade
secret protection does not fit a traditional justification for
intellectual property laws: to encourage and incentivize spending
and research to develop useful commercial information. No
incentive is needed to encourage companies to buy low and sell high,
for that is the ordinary function of the market, and the generation of
a price itself is not the same thing as the generation of the
information to be sold (or licensed, as the case may be). Moreover,
in the narrow PBM context where price gouging has emerged as a
serious policy concern, the abstract argument that pharmaceutical
manufacturers would not be incentivized to spend on drug
development absent the ability to suppress such pricing seems
dubious, and the burden should be on the proponent of such an
argument to demonstrate why a hypothetical decrease in research
not only would come true, but would outweigh the consumer benefit
from lower prices for existing pharmaceutical products. And of
course, markets generally seem to be able to create perfectly
adequate innovation incentives without resorting to hidden prices.
The trade secret statutes do not explicitly mention pricing
information among their illustrative lists of information that can
qualify as a trade secret. The federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, for
example, states that such information includes “all forms and types
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of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering
information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program
devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques,
processes, procedures, programs, or codes[.]” 98 Delaware’s
enactment of the earlier version of the state Uniform Trade Secrets
Act and California’s enactment of the later version both list “a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique,
or process[.]”99 The absence of a specific type of information from
these general categories, however, does not mean that the omitted
information cannot constitute a trade secret. But with no specific
mention of naked prices, the issue remains an open question. And,
as described above, merely labeling something as confidential in a
nondisclosure agreement does not fill the gap and transform
information into a trade secret.100
Moreover, if others in the same market reach similar pricing
arrangements for similar contracts, it is not clear that pricing could
constitute a trade secret for an altogether different reason: if the
relevant market participants are reaching the same or similar
outcomes independently of one another, such information may be
generally known to those in the trade, and thus not a trade secret
even if all of them treat it as such.101 Trade secret law, after all, is
not a monopoly, and if two different companies come up with the
same information independently and nobody publishes it,
theoretically both own the same trade secret—though neither knows
that the other also has rights in the same information. And, if not
two but all or almost all relevant players in a market come up with
the same information, there is no trade secret at all. That is why the
federal Defend Trade Secrets Act provides that independent
development is not, itself, misappropriation, 102 just as state law
courts have also held for many years.103 Thus, it is also possible that
98

See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). To be sure, financial information is a broad and illdefined category, but it seems more attuned to information that falls within normal
trade secret coverage, such as (for example) research and development costs for a
specific type of laboratory testing. See OR. REV. STAT. § 646.461 (listing “cost
data” among examples of protectable information in Oregon’s version of the
Uniform Act). A price is not the same thing.
99
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2001(4); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d).
100
See supra note 51.
101
See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(B) (information is not a trade secret if it is
generally known by those who can benefit from it); CAL. CIV. CODE §
3426.1(d)(1) (same).
102
See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(6)(B) (“independent derivation” is not “improper
means”).
103
California is the only UTSA jurisdiction to embed the concept of independent
derivation into its statute, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(a), but courts applying
state law in other jurisdictions have uniformly protected a defendant’s
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if the handful of major PBMs reach very similar pricing
arrangements with health care plans, the basic definition of trade
secrecy may further limit protection.
Beyond these observations, however, is the question of whether
transaction-specific prices that change over time and are subject to
renegotiation truly fall within the class of information that can ever
constitute a trade secret—in particular, in the highly-regulated
pharmaceutical industry.
1. Existing Arguments Against Pricing as Trade Secrets
By far the most sophisticated approach to this question is by
Annemarie Bridy in 2009. Based on experience litigating on behalf
of a non-profit with medical device manufacturers over whether
pricing information in contracts constituted a trade secret, she argues
that medical device pricing is not a trade secret and that propertizing
it as such “might contribute to the unsustainably rising cost of health
care.”104
Bridy’s argument is complex. She questions whether trade secret
law is best constituted as a theory of property rights at all, rather
than relational theory (an approach that foregrounds duties among
contracting parties and is less interested in defining and testing the
validity of specific information claimed as intellectual property).105
Similarly, she asserts the existence of a class of information that is
not a trade secret, but merely “confidential business information of
a non-trade secret nature.” 106 Unfortunately, these initial
philosophical moves would destabilize the concept that trade secret
law is unitary and thus encompasses business information said to be
“confidential” under common standards. As discussed below, these
subtle theoretical expressions of theory pose dangers for promoting
independent development of the same, non-public information as well. E.g.,
Moore v. Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc., 318 F.3d 561, 572 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting
that the plaintiff in a trade secret case bears the ultimate burden to prove that
defendant did not independently derive its own information); Ahlert v. Hasbro,
Inc., 325 F. Supp. 2d 509, 515 (D.N.J. 2004) (example of independent derivation
where defendant presented records of independent development of toy gun
design).
104
See Bridy, supra note 66, at 188. Bridy has also advocated for the legislative
solution of enacting rules barring certain types of confidentiality agreements for
medical device pricing. See JAMES C. ROBINSON & ANNEMARIE BRIDY,
CONFIDENTIALITY AND TRANSPARENCY FOR MEDICAL DEVICE PRICES: MARKET
DYNAMICS AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES (Berkeley Ctr. for Health Tech. Oct.
2009), https://bcht.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/device-prices-transparencyreport.pdf.
105
See Bridy, supra note 66, at 193–94.
106
See id. at 203.
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pharmaceutical pricing.
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That said, having proposed these lines of approach, Bridy’s primary
argument centers on revitalizing an insight from the 1939
Restatement of Torts, which provided the basis for civil trade secret
law before the states gradually adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act beginning in 1979. As she notes, trade secret cases early in the
twentieth century often excluded “ordinary, private commercial
information” from trade secret protection.107 As a result, comment
B to Section 757 of the Restatement stated that trade secret
protection should not extend to “information as to single or
ephemeral events in the conduct of a business,” including “the
amount of other items of a secret bid.” Rather, trade secret
protection was to be limited to “a process or device for continuous
use in the operation of the business.”108 Thus, Bridy notes that trade
secrets were to be “durable information on which the business
runs.”109
Of course, the state law versions of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
superseded the 1939 Restatement—except in New York, the last
holdout as of this writing. 110 In superseding the Restatement, the
Uniform Act explicitly rejected the limitation that only information
in “continuous use” could constitute a trade secret. The official
commentary to the 1985 version of the Uniform Act, for example,
states that the Act’s “definition of ‘trade secret’ contains a
reasonable departure from the Restatement of Torts (First) definition
which required that a trade secret be ‘continuously used in one’s
business.’ The broader definition in the proposed Act extends
protection to a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or
acquired the means to put a trade secret to use.”111 That change
made sense, because the “continuous use” restriction meant that a
company’s ongoing research and development efforts, or novel
107

See id. at 197.
See id. at 198 (discussing RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757, cmt. B (1939)).
109
See id.
110
Notably, New York still maintains the rule that trade secrecy does not extend
to ephemeral events such as single financial transactions. E.g., Bear, Stearns
Funding, Inc. v. Interface Group-Nev., Inc., 361 F. Supp. 2d 283, 305–06
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that financial and loan information from single, past
transaction did not meet the continuous use requirement and citing Lehman v.
Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285, 298 (2nd Cir. 1986) for the similar proposition
that ephemeral information about a third party’s potential availability for a deal,
and the attractiveness of that potential deal was did not meet continuous use
requirement).
111
See UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT WITH 1985 AMENDMENTS § 1, cmt. (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1986).
108
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ideas not yet put to practice, would not receive trade secret
protection if someone were to misappropriate such information.112
Thus, the Uniform Act and its comments did not repeat the
Restatement’s language about transitory or ephemeral information
not qualifying for trade secret protection, but the Uniform Act’s
logic was aimed at a different issue.113 Bridy therefore argues that
the drafters of the Uniform Act, in doing away with the continuous
use requirement, but also the rest of Comment b by silent omission,
only inadvertently left open the possibility that pricing information
could be a trade secret under the UTSA. 114 Omitting that
requirement, she argues, has nothing to do with rendering
“transaction specific sales price information” into a trade secret.115
She notes that many courts still occasionally cited the Restatement
even after the local jurisdiction had adopted the Uniform Act, and
that—at least on the facts—courts have often rejected trade secret
claims based on pricing information.116
Ultimately, Bridy argues that courts should consider the Uniform
Act’s removal of the continuous use requirement in context, and not
assume that the removal of that requirement necessarily meant that
the remainder of the Restatement’s Comment b as to ephemeral,
transaction-specific information was thereby also to fall within the
ambit of trade secret protection. She finds no intent, on the part of
the Uniform Act’s drafters, to turn pricing information into trade
secrets.117
The State of California made a similar, though truncated, argument
when opposing Amgen’s motion for a preliminary injunction against
112

More controversially, this UTSA comment also states that “negative”
information can receive protection. See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 2.03[2]
(2017) (noting change from Restatement). This concept is vague and difficult to
define, and may pose public policy concerns as to the rights of departing
employees. E.g., Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15
TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 387 (2007). In other words, the UTSA’s attempt to
correct a portion of the Restatement created its own set of nettlesome ambiguities.
113
Jim Pooley argues that this omission means that the UTSA does, in fact,
recognize ephemeral information because it is “considerably broader” than the
Restatement. See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 2.03[2][a] (2017) (“Under the
modern formation reflected in the Uniform Act, bid information is protected.”).
114
See Bridy, supra note 66 at 200 (“Although the drafters of the UTSA did not
mean to bring ephemeral business information within the scope of trade secrecy
when they eliminated the requirement of continuous use from the statutory
definition, such has been the unintended consequence of the modification, at least
in some jurisdictions that have adopted the UTSA.”).
115
See id. at 199.
116
See id. at 201–02.
117
See id. at 207–08.
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the publication of upcoming changes in drug pricing in 2019. It
argued both a factual issue— that the information at issue had
already been disclosed to “nearly 200 private and public purchases
and PBMs who are under no obligation to preserve [Amgen’s]
confidentiality”—as well as the definitional issue. Specifically, the
state argued that, (1) information merely about estimating pricing is
not a trade secret at all; and (2) as with Bridy’s analysis, information
about single or ephemeral events is not a trade secret at all.118 Thus,
these types of arguments are very much part of the landscape in
current regulatory disclosure disputes.
McClure and Dulaney, discussed above in the context of FOIA case
law, also seem to take a similar approach. McClure, in advocating
that pricing information in government contracts should be
disclosed in FOIA and Trade Secrets Act disputes, argues that “the
definition of a trade secret from the Restatement of Torts should be
applied for non-FOIA cases.” 119 Dulaney, by contrast, does not
make an IP-based argument when proposing that the public interest
should prevail in FOIA and other disputes over the publication of
pricing information in government contracts, but his arguments are
congruent with a concept that such information is transitory and not
deserving of trade secret protection in that context.120
2. Fine-Tuning the Critique
Bridy, McClure, and Dulaney offer important insights into why
pricing information in the context of Pharmacy Benefit Manager
agreements with pharmaceutical companies should not receive trade
secret protection against regulatory disclosure in the public interest.
At the same time, their analyses can be strengthened to better fit
today’s environment, where the Federal Act has been enacted and
some version of the Uniform Act is now law in almost every state.121
118

See Respondent’s Notice at 20-21, Amgen Inc. v. Cal. Corr. Health Serv., No.
18-stcp-03147 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 28, 2019). Unfortunately, the state’s argument
was short and buried deep within its brief. It also relied on older, pre-UTSA case
law under the Restatement, when trade secrets had to be in continuous use. See
id. (citing Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 207 (1971) (requiring disclosure
of pesticide-related information because it was not in continuous use under then
then-controlling standard). As discussed here, the thrust of the State’s argument
is entirely correct, and need not rely on such older case law.
119
See McClure, supra note 77, at 217. McClure notes Comment b as well. See
id. at 214.
120
See Dulaney, supra note 83, at 37, 49 (arguing for “a balancing test that
incorporates the public interest”).
121
Massachusetts became the latest state to adopt a version of the UTSA in
October 2018. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 42–42G. Although Alabama and
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To begin with, we need not seek to destabilize trade secret law as a
form of property rights in order to argue that pricing information is
not a trade secret in the pharmacy benefit context. That is
unnecessarily swinging a broad hammer against a very narrow nail.
Moreover, it could have unintended negative consequences. In
particular, if we start from the presumption that trade secret law
should be calibrated to reflect important public policy objectives and
not merely private commercial interests, there is a significant need
to strongly uphold trade secret law as a property theory, and not the
relational theory that the older Restatement would have found
appropriate. Specifically, in the common employer/employee
context, departing employees have more balanced rights in disputes
brought by their former employers if trade secrets are seen as
objective, well-defined property rights than in a relational regime
where trade secrets could be vaguely-defined, amorphous, and
perhaps even available in the public domain. 122 Indeed, by
definition a relational theory is significantly more interested in
whether the defendant was in a trusted relationship with the plaintiff,
and less so in whether the plaintiff has defined specific items as
intellectual property that must then be tested for validity. For that
reason, a relational theory of trade secret law makes it more difficult
for courts to focus on whether specific items of information asserted
to be trade secrets should, in fact, receive such protection. Under a
relational approach, those asserting trade secrecy rights are more
likely to escape scrutiny of overbroad, conclusory claims that broad
areas of information are protectable. A property theory focuses
everyone on whether any discrete item of information truly qualifies
for protection.
Nor should we seek a short cut through the pricing quandary by
arguing for the existence of a category of so-called “confidential
business information” that is not the same thing as a trade secret.
This is the approach that is latent if one were to lean on the
Restatement to revitalize its commentary, as well as what the State
of Nevada expressly argued in a 2017 regulatory disclosure case.123
North Carolina have trade secret statutes that do not entirely match the UTSA, the
family resemblance is sufficient to treat them as the same, and for purposes of this
Article the differences among the various statutes do not matter.
122
These points are detailed extensively, with relevant case law, in Charles Tait
Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and Consequences, 15 GA. J. OF
INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007).
123
See Bridy, supra note 66, at 203; see also Nevada Legislature’s Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6–7, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of Am. v. Sandoval, No. 2:17-cv-02315-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. Oct.
1, 2017) (“confidential business information that does not rise to the level of a
trade secret is not entitled to the same level of protection”).

103

Advocating for the creation of a second class of protectable
information in addition to the official class of trade secrets would
backfire. It would provide theoretical cover to assert that non-secret
information should nonetheless receive legal protection as if it were
a trade secret. That is, instead of a two-tier, binary distinction
between protectable information and information that is
unprotectable and thus usable by all, this concept would create a
three-tier, or even multi-tier system where an information-holder
has several bites at the apple to assert some level of protection, even
for information that is not a trade secret. That would strengthen the
hand of the party seeking nondisclosure and weaken the hand of
those seeking disclosure in the public interest.
Moreover, such an artificial distinction is arbitrary and analytically
impossible to sustain. For example, what exactly is the difference
between trade secrets and business information said to be
“confidential?” 124 There is no history analytically defining a
defensible line between the two, nor can we imagine one when a
civil defendant seeks to show that information is in the public
domain and thus unprotectable. More important, it runs squarely
against the state Uniform Act’s preemption doctrine, which is a key
part of the modern operation of state trade secret law in almost all
UTSA jurisdictions. Just as patent law preempts attempts by
litigants and state legislatures to use state law to relax the
requirements of the patent laws to assert claims over unpatented
information, and just as copyright law preempts state law claims
which likewise seek to assert IP-like protection over information
that does not meet copyrightability requirements, the Uniform Acts
which contain a displacement clause seek to prevent litigants who
assert tort claims such as conversion or unfair competition from
evading the need to establish trade secrecy.125 In the case of the state
Uniform Act, a large majority of courts have ruled that state trade
secret law blocks attempts by civil litigants to use tort law to chase
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This does not include personal private information of the type that is the
subject of the privacy laws, rather than the intellectual property laws. That is what
our qualifier “business information” means.
125
See, e.g., Robin Feldman, Federalism, First Amendment, and Patents: The
Fraud Fallacy, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L.J. 30 (2015) (describing issues related
to federal preemption of state laws in various contexts). For examples of federal
patent preemption and federal copyright preemption versus state law, see
generally Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989)
(patent preemption of a state statute); Sammons & Sons v. Ladd-Fab, Inc., 138
Cal. App. 3d 306 (1982) (patent preemption of state law tort claims); Ultraflo
Corp. v. Pelican Tank Parts, Inc., 845 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2017) (copyright
preemption of state law tort claim).
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departing employees with dubious claims over information said to
be “confidential but not secret.”126
These rulings have been critical in preventing employers from
bullying departing employees. Imagine circumstances without such
a ruling. The state’s trade secret act would hold that information was
not protected, and therefore employees would be free to use the
information as they move to new employment. Despite this,
companies would have a powerful weapon to wield against former
employers in civil litigation or to hinder employee mobility. Even if
an employee-defendant establishes that information is not a trade
secret (perhaps because it is publicly available), the employer may
still proceed using nebulous tort claims such as “breach of
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UTSA preemption is a topic addressed by a number of articles, including
Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett, UTSA Preemption and the Public
Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law Claims
Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 59 (2013). Some of the
states whose highest courts or appellate courts in precedential opinions have
affirmed UTSA preemption include Robbins v. Supermarket Sales, LLC v.
Supermarket Equip. Sales, LLC, 722 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Ga. 2012) (approving prior
Georgia case law to hold that allowing injunctive relief for information that failed
to qualify as a trade secret “undermined the exclusivity of the GTSA”); BlueEarth
Biofuels, LLC v. Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 235 P.3d 310 (Haw. 2010) (describing
the current state of UTSA preemption law nationwide, and siding with other state
supreme courts in favoring the majority approach); Mortgage Specialists, Inc. v.
Davey, 904 A.2d 652, 665 (N.H. 2006) (affirming pre-trial order dismissing
alternative claims, ruling that UTSA is intended as sole claim for trade secret
misuse); RK Enter., LLC v. Pro-Comp Mgmt, Inc., 158 S.W.3d 685, 689–90 (Ark.
2004) (reversing trial court; finding broad preemption of alternative tort claim);
Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 898 (Del. 2002) (affirming preemption
of unfair competition and conspiracy claims at the pleading stage); Dicks v.
Jensen, 768 A.2d 1279, 1285 (Vt. 2001) (holding that UTSA preemption applies
to common law claims even if the information does not meet the statutory
definition of a trade secret); Frantz v. Johnson, 999 P.2d 351, 357–58 (Nev. 2000)
(reversing trial court and holding in favor of broad preemption of various
alternative tort claims); Weins v. Sporleder, 605 N.W.2d 488, 492 (S.D. 2000)
(reversing trial court and holding in favor of broad preemption; explaining that it
would render the UTSA “meaningless” if a plaintiff’s trade secret claim is
dismissed and “plaintiffs can simply pursue the same claim in the name of a tort”).
However, there is a minority position essentially deleting the UTSA’s preemption
clause, characterized by rulings which egregiously misconstrue the statutory text
and seemingly lack any awareness of the existence and purpose of statutory IP
preemption. E.g., American Biomed, Grp., Inc. v. Techtrol, Inc., 374 P.3d 820,
827–28 (Okla. 2016) (misreading statutory text and ignoring official UTSA
commentary for simplistic ruling that statute does not preempt purported torts
over information said to be confidential but not secret—whatever that is supposed
to encompass); Burbank Grease Serv., LLC v. Sokolowski, 717 N.W.2d 781 (Wis.
2006) (ruling, over passionate dissent, against preemption of alternative tort
claims despite preemption clause in Wisconsin UTSA; no analysis or awareness
of public policy issues at stake with respect to IP preemption).
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confidence” or “unfair competition.”127 Thus, in attempting to push
back expansive trade secret claims that are being used in a troubling
manner, one could inadvertently open up even more expansive
pathways for troubling behavior.
This prospect highlights the dangers that can occur as trade secret
law expands rapidly into new areas. Now that the idea has taken hold
in the mind of litigants that trade secret provides a potential weapon
throughout the legal landscape, the race is on. In this crush, courts,
legislators, and regulators can easily stumble as parties rush to apply
trade secret in ever-expanding ways—leaving the history and logic
of trade secret law to be trampled in the dust. In a similar vein,
scholars and commentators, appalled at the aggressive tactics
employed by those who assert trade secret claims at every turn, may
also be tempted by approaches that solve the problem at hand while
providing unintended consequences in collateral arenas. At this
critical juncture in the history of trade secret law, it is essential to
search out broad, comprehensive approaches that can impose
discipline on the legal sprawl in a manner that is consistent and
logically coherent across all boundaries. With this in mind, the
following section suggests an approach that can resolve the question
at hand in a manner that could be applied throughout doctrinal areas
facing the invasive species of trade secret claims. Along the way,
we will draw both from doctrines in other areas of intellectual
property law and from doctrines in other areas of civil litigation that
can help tame the sprawl.
IV. NAKED PRICE AND STEPPING BACK FROM THE BRINK
As trade secret law continues to gain prominence, and as scholars,
judges, and practitioners struggle with the public policy problems
posed by overbroad application of trade secrecy assertions, we
should strive to approach these problems in a manner that best serves
the overall public interest, in addition to the public interest at stake
in any given problem area. Indeed, if recent articles are indicative,
the attention given to the public interest in various aspects of trade
secret law—many extending well outside the traditional area of
employee/employee disputes—will only continue to grow.128 Here,
we should theorize pricing in regulatory disputes in the
pharmaceutical industry in a manner that is consonant with
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E.g., SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity Corp., 2012 WL 6160472 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(rejecting former employer’s attempt to proceed on tort claims styled as covering
information said to be confidential, but not secret).
128
See supra notes 9–13.
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promoting the public interest in employment disputes as well as
these other areas of law.
To that end, we recognize that the Federal Act is in place now
alongside the state Uniform Acts, and that case law under the 1939
Restatement is merely a residual influence where it is consistent
with these statutes. We need to put the insights of other scholars
regarding trade secrecy and pricing information, as well as new
insights, to work in this contemporary legal environment.
We start with the point that there is something perplexing about an
assertion that a price is a company’s intellectual property, especially
in the sense that society receives something in return for private
protection. The case law cited above nibbles around the edges at best,
and no court seems to have tackled this question at a deep analytical
level.
Defining the problem as one simply of ephemeral or transitory
information is too imprecise. After all, one can readily envision a
sort of Eureka moment, where a scientist or engineer suddenly
thinks of an idea that is new and novel, and that in and of itself is
highly valuable. Indeed, ideas—as ephemeral as they may be—can
constitute trade secrets.129 By the same token, however, a company
could spend years and millions of dollars to develop concrete and
lasting technology that, unbeknownst to the developer, someone else
released into the public domain, thus negating any trade secret
protection. So comparing the time spent thinking about something,
or the amount of time or effort put into creating something, versus
an idea that arose quickly as a passing thought or a transitory
moment, does not in and of itself tell us why pricing information
should not receive trade secret status.
One can find theoretical companionship in both copyright and patent
law for the notion that determining whether something is properly
the subject of protection does not rest on concepts such as the level
129

E.g., Altavion, Inc. v. Konica Minolta Sys. Lab. Inc., 226 Cal. App. 4th 26
(2014) (finding that ideas can constitute trade secrets; plaintiff had idea for bar
code scanner that was not developed into a product); Charles Tait Graves, Ruling
Continues Solidification of Trade Secrets Law, DAILY JOURNAL, May 30, 2014
(noting that it was “not surprising” that the Altavion court found business ideas to
fall within the scope of trade secret law, and that a contrary result would have
“badly damaged the overall structure of trade secret law” by encouraging litigants
to turn to “vague, standards-free tort labels” to litigate over such information if it
had been pushed outside the scope of the UTSA). That said, Annemarie Bridy
noted in comments to the authors that an idea might be seen as persistent, rather
than ephemeral, because (at least in some cases) the value of the idea carries
forward past a single transaction – unlike a price.
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of effort and the concrete nature of the creation. Copyright doctrine,
for example, holds that one does not gain rights in a work merely
through the “sweat of the brow.” 130 A work must possess the
requisite modicum of creativity, regardless of how much labor the
inventor expended.131 As the Court noted:
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of a
compiler’s labor may be used by others without
compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly
observed, however, that is not “some unforeseen
byproduct of a statutory regime. It is, rather “the
essence of copyright . . . .”132
Copyright in the United States does dictate that a work must be fixed
in a tangible medium of expression to obtain protection, an approach
that arguably prevents entirely ephemeral works from protection.
Nevertheless, the copyright fixation requirement—with its logic
related to proof of infringement133 —is entirely separate from the
question of whether the requisite creativity exists. All the fixation in
the world will not render a noncreative work subject to protection.134
Similarly, patent law has rejected analogous concepts. In rulings on
patentable subject matter, the Supreme Court has rebuffed
arguments that expensive research leading to valuable discoveries
should be protectable.135 When the resulting invention is merely a
law of nature, the result remains unpatentable.136 Patent law, in fact,
does not even require the type of concreteness of fixation one might
imagine. Rather a patent applicant need not have actually made the
invention to obtain protection but can merely describe how one
might go about it. This convention, known as “constructive
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See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (landmark case
rejecting judicially created “sweat of the brow” concept for copyright protection
in a case concerning telephone books).
131
See generally id.
132
Id. at 349 (internal citations omitted).
133
See Kelley v. Chi. Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 304 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Fixation
serves two basic roles: (1) easing problems of proof of creation and
infringement. . . .” (quoting 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:22
(2010)).
134
See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 346–47 (identifying a minimal creativity
requirement for copyright protection).
135
See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 91–92
(2012) (rejecting patentable subject matter in a case related to medical
diagnostics).
136
See, e.g., id.
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reduction to practice,”137 would not even meet copyright’s fixation
requirement, given that the constructive reduction to practice is only
a description, rather than the thing itself. The point is simply that
copyright and patent law eschew notions such as level of effort and
ephemerality for determining whether a creation should be the
subject of protection. One can find theoretical companionship in
both copyright and patent law for the notion that determining
whether something is properly the subject of protection does not rest
on concepts such as the level of effort and the concrete nature of the
creation.
In an analogous manner, ephemerality (or transitoriness) seems too
elastic a concept by itself to address the question of whether material
should constitute proper subject matter of trade secret protection.138
Consider specifically the issue of price. A price may or may not be
labeled transitory, as the contract reflecting the price may remain in
force for some time.
Instead, we should take the points made by the old Comment b in
the Restatement, as well as statements in the courts which have
expressed doubts about price information constituting a trade secret,
as hints that a price is not intellectual property at all—at least in the
highly regulated industry in question. The reasons why are
straightforward under a contemporary intellectual property theory.
A price is not an idea. It is a negotiated point representing value to
be exchanged for something. It is a point on a line between two
adverse parties, not an act of creation. A price is not an idea in the
sense of an origin point for future development, or something latent
for additional thinking: it is not inchoate. Even if one could argue
that the terms and the pricing approaches one uses to arrive at the
price are somehow tantamount to creation, the simple naked price is
a number, not something particularly creative. Moreover, the value
itself is an abstract placeholder: it could have been something
different and was arrived at through adverse negotiation where it
was unknown until there was mutual agreement. It is not the same
thing as the development of the ideas instantiated in the
pharmaceutical products being sold. The property right in the
contract is the amount due, the receivable—not the abstract signifier
representing that amount.
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U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE § 2138.05 (9th ed. 2018) [hereinafter MPEP].
138
A definition of “ephemeral” is “lasting a very short time,” and synonyms
include “transitory,” “transient,” “fleeting,” and “evanescent.” Ephemeral,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ephemeral
(last visited Feb. 23, 2020).
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In fact, the entire notion of price as a creation crumbles apart when
one presses on the notion of who the creators are. Price emerges
during negotiations between the two parties to an agreement. Thus,
price is born through the joint activity of two parties, not one alone.
We are not talking about parthenogenesis here.139 If price were a
valid joint creation of those parties, neither party would be able to
reveal the secret, without the permission of the other. Thus, the drug
company would not be able to use the same price (or even the same
terms) with another PBM or another health plan without the original
PBM’s permission, because the price would belong to the two of
them jointly.140
In addition, recall that the three PBMs control most of the PBM
market. Suppose a drug company has prices or terms that are the
similar for all three PBMs. Can price be a secret in that context when
all of the PBMs competitors in an industry have a similar price and
therefore know the secret? After all, the PBMs are theoretically joint
owners if there is a secret; but if all of them are getting roughly the
same price, all of them know the price, and there is no secret in their
industry. 141 In a broader context, beyond that of pharmaceutical
companies, if price were a trade secret created jointly and thus coowned by the seller and the customer, sellers would be unable to
charge substantially similar prices to customers. Doing so would
risk that the customers would all know the secret, and thus, allowing
the first customer to use litigation to inhibit the seller and its rivals.
One cannot imagine that such an outcome—in which a company
could not charge a similar price to more than one of its customers—
would be consistent with the underpinnings of trade secret law,
which is firmly rooted in the notion that companies should be able
to interact with others and conduct their business in a rational and
efficient manner without risking their valuable intellectual property.
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In parthenogenesis, reproduction occurs when a female gamete produces an
embryo without any genetic contribution from a male gamete. See Ursula
Mittwoch, Parthenogensis, 15 J. MED. GENET. 165 (1978).
140
See POOLEY, supra note 51, at § 5.01[1][c] n.10 (2017 ed.) (“Courts have held
that one joint owner’s use of a secret without the permission of the other states a
trade secret claim, and that one joint owner’s disclosure to a knowing third party
without the other’s permission also states a claim against both the discloser and
the recipient.”; citing cases including MGP Ingredients, Inc. v. Mars, Inc. 2006
WL 3530726, at *5 (D. Kan. 2006) (joint owner sued the other owner and its
parent)).
141
The existence of information aggregation services in the pharmaceutical
industry could, in itself, threaten the existence of the secret. To the extent that
these services are able to reverse engineer the price and offer to sell that
information, the information would become knowable and no longer secret.
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Moreover, price is created in an adversarial process. 142 An
adversarial process appears decidedly different from the normal
context of joint creation. And if the creation belongs jointly to the
PBM and the drug company, is the PBM violating its fiduciary duty
to the health plan as the agent and brokers for those plans by creating
intellectual property that will be owned jointly with a party who is
supposed to be on the other side of the table from the health plan?
Together, all of these issues illustrate the logical absurdity of the
notion that price is some type of a creation that should be subject to
intellectual property protection of any kind.
This is especially so in the narrow context at issue, with its specific
types of agreements. In the case of PBM contracts, the existence of
the agreement, the identities of the contracting parties and the goods
and services to be exchanged for that value are all known. These
are not secret transactions. PBM contracts are not the product of
secret customer lists, where one party to the transaction is unknown.
Much is known. This is not a startup company working in so-called
“stealth mode” on an idea that is being kept deeply hidden. Indeed,
the economic marker of price is among the few major points that are
not already transparent in these contracts. Where so many variables
are already known, the case for trade secrecy over price is weaker
than, say, a business transaction that is entirely unknown, and
outside a highly regulated environment.
Ultimately, a price is not a company’s intellectual property in this
scenario, but instead is a negotiated deal point that an incumbent
hopes to hold onto in order to avoid competition. The incumbent got
there first, so to speak, and the price is the point at which it arrived.
Nevertheless, the company wants to treat “getting there first” as
equivalent to “intellectual property.” In short, in the PBM context
where the contracting parties are known, the subject of their
agreement is known, and the product being sold is known, the price
at which the parties arrive is not propertizable intellectual
property. 143 The Restatement’s concepts of ephemerality and
transitoriness point in the right direction, but do not provide nearly
the necessary logical and theoretical robustness.
142

For discussions of perverse incentives in which the PBM middle players may
be tempted to act in the interests of the drug companies rather than in the interests
of the PBMs’ own client, the health plan, see generally FELDMAN, supra note 5.
143
There is a further consideration for older pricing information as to past
contracts. Even if one treated current pricing information as a trade secret,
outdated information may lack the economic value required under the DTSA and
the UTSA. See generally Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Sys. Corp., 154 Cal. App.
4th 547, 578 (2007) (trade secret claim over obsolete software items failed
because such software did not meet the UTSA’s value requirement).
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Even if one were to conclude that bare negotiated price points
between PBMs and pharmaceutical manufacturers might constitute
trade secret, however, there would be no show-stopping immunity
against regulatory disclosure in the context of trade secret. To begin
with, the Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts do not provide an
immunity to the owner of a trade secret against regulatory disclosure.
The state uniform acts provide trade secret owners with a range of
remedies against civil misappropriation, while the federal act also
provides for prosecutions against criminal misappropriation. Both
statutes seek to balance interests between civil plaintiffs (or
prosecutors) and defendants by offering limited rights balanced by
the need for a robust public domain and rights to independent
development. Importantly, neither purports to preempt regulatory
or administrative statutes.
For example, California’s version of the Uniform Act states that it
“does not supersede . . . any statute otherwise regulating trade
secrets.” 144 More directly, the federal act provides two different
types of immunities, but none against regulatory disclosure. It
immunizes whistleblowers who disclose their employer’s trade
secrets to counsel or to the government from lawsuits by their
employers,145 and it immunizes internet service providers from civil
misappropriation claims based on user-generated content pursuant
to 47 U.S.C. § 230.146 But the federal act contains no immunity
against legislation or regulations requiring pharmaceutical pricing
disclosures, even though Congress was surely well aware that
various regulatory regimes require submission of potentially
confidential information by private companies with at least some
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See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.7(a). This language, one of the exceptions to the
UTSA’s general preemption of overlapping tort claims, was undoubtedly
designed as a savings clause to avoid conflict with the many California statutes
that in some fashion regulate trade secrets— including regulatory disclosure
measures. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1060 (treatment of trade secrets in civil
proceedings); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 14022 (treatment of trade secrets
submitted to government during pesticide evaluations); CAL. GOV’T CODE §
6254.7 (same for air pollution data).
145
See 18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (“Immunity from Liability for Confidential
Disclosure of a Trade Secret to the Government or in a Court Filing”).
146
See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114–153, 130 Stat. 376
(2016), § 2(g) (stating, perhaps oddly at first glance, that the DTSA is not a statute
pertaining to intellectual property—language necessary to fit the statute into
Section 230’s safe harbor immunity); Craft Beer Stellar, LLC v. Glassdoor, Inc.,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 178960, 2018 WL 5084837 (D. Mass. Oct. 17, 2018)
(applying immunity to dismiss DTSA claim against website which allows users
to anonymously review their employers); Eric Goldman, The Defend Trade
Secrets Act isn’t an “Intellectual Property” Law, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 541 (2016) (commentary on immunity).
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possibility of public disclosure.147 Though by no means dispositive,
the point is that PBMs received no specific protection in this recent
legislation.
In short, trade secret law does not present some unusual barrier to
regulatory activity. Rather, any regulatory activity should lead
instead to the weighing and balancing of the public interest versus
the supposed harm in disclosing such pricing. Legislatures are
capable of making reasoned decisions regarding this calculus—
especially as to business entities who seek to characterize the very
product of their market-capture (artificially high pricing) as
intellectual property.148 Indeed, the case where companies engaging
in exploitation of the citizenry who are effectively captive buyers
under health insurance policies to high pharmaceutical prices
appears to be a model instance where regulators should put the
brakes on overbroad use of trade secrecy assertions. This would
echo legislation enacted in the interest of consumers who face
serious disadvantages such as information asymmetry, 149 highpressure sales tactics,150 and extremely limited bargaining power.151
147

Cf. Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less
Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REV. 547, 579–580 (1979)
(seminal article on regulatory failure by Justice Breyer prior to joining the Court
noting that disclosure regulation can serve as an effective alternative to classical
regulation in achieving a more competitive market when “the public can
understand the information disclosed and is free to choose on the basis of that
information.”).
148
See supra note 95 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court of North
Dakota reached such a decision, finding that price information constituted a trade
secret, but that it nonetheless was subject to regulatory disclosure and did not
constitute a taking, given the public interest in rates charged in natural gas
agreements. See N. States Power Co. v. N.D. Pub. Serv. Comm., 502 N.W.2d
240, 247 (N.D. 1993).
149
See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–2312 (2006) (federal law related to
automobile purchasing); see also 120 CONG. REC. S40,711 (daily ed. Dec. 18,
1974) (statement of Sen. Frank Moss) (“By making warranties of consumer
products clear and understandable through creating a uniform terminology of
warranty coverage, consumers will for the first time have a clear and concise
understanding of the terms of warranties of products they are considering
purchasing.”). Mandatory banking disclosures serve a similar purpose in creating
greater market transparency to reduce asymmetric information. See, e.g.,
Disclosure of Financial and Other Information by FDIC-Insured State
Nonmember Banks, 84 Fed. Reg. 9698–9702 (Mar. 18, 2019) (codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 350).
150
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429 (2015) (strengthening a 1972 Federal Trade
Commission Cooling-Off Rule designed to prevent “deceptive and unfair
practices, including high pressure sales tactics; misrepresenting the quality of
goods; and placing inappropriate roadblocks to obtaining refunds”).
151
See UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302 (holding that upon finding a contract
unconscionable, a court may refuse to enforce the entire contract, enforce the
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To the extent that courts and legislatures may struggle with these
issues, the struggle would highlight the paucity of decisions and
analyses at the intersection of trade secret with other regimes, as
well as the need for more robust doctrines in trade secret, itself.
V. THIN TRADE SECRET
Perhaps no single statement sums up the state of legal scholarship
in the realm of intellectual property than a comment from the legal
scholar Richard Epstein, who dryly noted the following:
The Field of intellectual property is a growth industry
that may, for all I know, involve, an unintended
consequence of Moore’s Law in that the number of
published articles in the field doubles on average
every eighteen months. Most of that increased effort
has been devoted to copyright and patents.152
Although trade secret literature also has expanded since Epstein’s
comment in 2004, patent and copyright remain well ahead of trade
secret, not only in terms of the number of articles published, but also
in terms of deep theoretical treatment. Even fifteen years of
miraculous brilliance in a field are unlikely to make up for centuries
of consideration in the judiciary and the academy.
With this in mind, trade secret could benefit from the wisdom of
experience gained in generations of development of copyright and
patent law. After all, though only patent and copyright can trace
their heritage to Constitutional provisions, all three doctrinal realms
flow from a consistent logical grounding: individuals would be
unwilling to invest in developing creations and bringing those
creations forward for the benefit of society unless the legal system
guaranteed the creators the potential to enjoy a return on the fruits

remainder without the offending clause, or limit the contracts. application to avoid
an unconscionable result); see also Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (defining unconscionability as “an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. . . . In many cases the
meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining
power”).
152
Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secret Under the
Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 57 (2004); see also Bridy, supra note 66,
at 188 (citing Epstein’s comment for the proposition that “trade secrets have taken
a back seat to copyrights and patents in the explosion of scholarship on intellectual
property in recent years”).
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of their labor, free from those who would copy. 153 We note, of
course, certain important caveats embedded in the language.
Among those are that the system exists for the benefit of society, not
the benefit of creators,154 that protecting a robust public domain is a
strong public interest,155 and that the law guarantees no more than
an opportunity to garner a return, rather than guaranteeing a
particular return or any return at all.156 Nevertheless, the more robust
jurisprudence of patent and copyright has dealt with a myriad of
challenges as those doctrinal areas have developed into their more
familiar modern forms—particularly when those intellectual
property regimes have brushed up against other policy arenas.
This is not to suggest that intellectual property always yields in the
face of other societal goals, or that it necessarily should. Rather,
patent and copyright each have developed doctrines to delineate
boundaries with other policies embedded in the legal system in an
effort to ensure that society can remain faithful to the underlying
logic of both. Thus, for example, patent law developed the doctrine
of patent misuse in the early twentieth century, as patent
jurisprudence crashed headlong into the burgeoning area of antitrust
law.157 In the same vein, copyright developed the doctrine of “thin”
protection as courts struggled with the need to respect other societal
goals, including freedom of information, and as society adapted to
the tectonic shifts of the digital age. In general, doctrines such as
misuse and thin protection embody the recognition that intellectual
property rights are not solid monoliths, presenting an impenetrable
wall through which no party but the rights holder may pass. Rather,
intellectual property regimes are brilliantly nimble and subtle
systems, deftly threading their way among various societal goals.
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See Epstein, supra note 152, at 57 (noting that “[i]n many ways, the logic for
protecting trade secrets parallels that for protecting patents and copyrights. People
will not develop certain forms of information at private cost if the benefits of that
information can be immediately socialized by the unilateral actions of others”).
154
See supra note 59.
155
E.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989)
(“Moreover, the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and
technologies into the public domain through disclosure.”).
156
See FELDMAN, supra note 56, at 3, 50–75 (introducing the bargain theory of
patents and explaining that “a patent grants some form of an opportunity—a seat
at the bargaining table, with certain rules in place”); see also Gideon
Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 66
(2005) (noting that studies suggest the vast majority of patents earn no returns at
all for their patent holders).
157
See Robin Feldman, Patent & Antitrust: Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA.
J. OF L. & TECH. 1 (2008).
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Along these lines, the doctrine of thin copyright protection is
particularly illuminating. The term “thin” copyright emerged in the
early 1990s in the Feist case, in which the Supreme Court
considered the question of copyright protection in a phone book.
The Court found that copyright protection in a factual work is “thin”
given that facts reside in the public domain and others are free to use
the factual information contained in a work. The Court emphasized
that “copyright is not a tool by which a compilation author may keep
others from using the facts or data he or she has collected.”158
When copyright is “thin,” the work reflects only scant creativity,
although some creativity in the creation or arrangement of
information is present. 159 In that circumstance, certain other
elements of the case must be particularly strong to warrant a finding
of copyright infringement. Specifically, some courts require
evidence of what is called “supersubstantial similarity” to find
infringement. 160 Courts have found thin copyright protection in
cases rejecting claims ranging from architectural plans to Barbie
dolls. 161 The logic of thin copyright reflects the concern that
copyright might be used to reach beyond its boundaries—extending
its grasp to subject matter that should not be restricted to the public
and blocking activity outside of the creative appropriation that
copyright was intended to prevent.
Beyond the doctrine of “thin” copyright, copyright law’s fair use
doctrine similarly reflects the need to prevent copyright from
reaching beyond its intended boundaries and to balance competing
public interests. Dating back to the nineteenth century, fair use is a
judicially created doctrine, eventually codified by Congress in the
1976 Copyright Act.162 Under the doctrine, even if someone has
copied a protected work, the court may rule that the copying is fair
rather than foul. 163 The fair use doctrine allows copying “for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .
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See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991).
See id. at 349.
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MELVILLE NIMMER, 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][4] (2019)
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See generally Charles W. Ross, Inc. v. Olsen Fine Home Bldg., LLC, 977 F.
Supp. 2d 567 (E.D. Va. 2013); Dream Custom Homes, Inc. v. Modern Day
Constr., Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Jeff Benton Homes, Inc. v.
Ala. Heritage Homes, Inc., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1231 (N.D. Ala. 2013); and Mattel,
Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010).
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U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE (Mar. 2019),
https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use.
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See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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scholarship, or research.”164 In the words of the Supreme Court, the
doctrine “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which
that law is designed to foster.” 165 More importantly, fair use
recognizes the importance of various public interests that might be
swept aside by an overzealous enforcement regime.166
A fair use deliberation includes, but is not limited to, four factors,
one of which is the nature of the copyrighted work.167 Under this
factor, the more a work is functional or informational, the less
protection the work will receive. 168 As the Supreme Court has
explained, the second fair use factor, “calls for recognition that some
works are closer to the core of copyright protection than others.”169
In the same vein as the thinness doctrine, fair use attempts to ensure
that copyright will not be used to cut off access to material that
should be in the public domain or to reach beyond the circumstances
in which copyright was intended to operate. Both doctrines thereby
balance copyright with competing public interests.
The misuse doctrines of patent and copyright are cut from the same
cloth. Both patent misuse and copyright misuse are infringement
defenses directed at attempts to improperly expand the time or scope
of the rights granted.170 They are reminders that intellectual property
rights are limited grants for limited purposes, not a government
license to mow down anyone in one’s path. As one of the authors
164
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See NIMMER, supra note 160, at § 13.05; see also Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG
Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing NIMMER); Cambridge
Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014) (same).
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has noted, “the law would not look kindly upon a patent-holder who
insists that anyone who wants to license the invention must agree to
murder the inventor’s mother-in-law.”171
As doctrines of equity, patent and copyright misuse spring from the
notion of requiring that parties who come to the court must do so
with unclean hands. As the age-old maxim goes, one who seeks
equity must do equity. In this vein, recent scholarship has suggested
that courts develop a doctrine of trade secret misuse to address
overreaching by trade secret owners.172 Trade secret misuse could
be deployed as a defense to improper licensing and enforcement
practices that threaten to expand the breadth of a trade secret
holder’s domain, and we welcome recent commentary in this
direction.173
Although important, intellectual property misuse doctrines have
certain drawbacks that need to be addressed in the trade secret space
in order to render a trade secret misuse theory most effective. The
remedy for patent and copyright misuse traditionally has been that
the intellectual property becomes unenforceable—not just in
conjunction with the particular behavior or in the case at hand, but
in any circumstance, at least until the misuse has been cleared.174 In
light of these potentially draconian effects, courts are reluctant to
find misuse, which renders the doctrine less effective than one might
hope.175
Moreover, the history of patent and copyright misuse is deeply
entwined with antitrust. Both trace their roots to early nineteenth
century caselaw regarding anti-competitive behavior. 176 The
troubling issues arising in the expansive use of modern trade secret
law, however, range far beyond anti-competitive conduct (although
that concern may be implicated at times). Rather, trade secret is
wandering into arenas that raise concerns regarding freedom of
speech, ability to petition for redress, labor protections, retaliatory
171
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L. REV. 901, 903, 963–964 (2007) (arguing in favor of reforming the remedy so
that the particular provision becomes unenforceable, rather than rendering the
entire intellectual property right unenforceable for a period of time).
175
See Varadarjan, supra note 9, at 797.
176
See generally Paredes, supra note 170 (tracing the history of copyright
misuse).
172

118

behavior, racial inequality, and other deep societal concerns. 177
Thus, a remedy grounded in anti-competitive concerns could fall
short unless it is tailored for a trade secret-specific application. The
promising new scholarship on trade secret misuse is hopefully the
start of a new wave of curbing trade secret overreach through such
calibration. Its development highlights the need for developing
doctrines to delineate appropriate limitations for trade secret’s
wanderings.
VI. A THEORY OF “THIN” TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
Companies seeking to avoid regulatory disclosure of pharmaceutical
pricing information seem to implicitly propose a hard binary: If any
item of information makes it over the line to qualify as a trade secret,
even if just barely, it is thus immune from disclosure. In short, the
potential industry argument is that trade secrecy poses an
insurmountable hurdle to requiring disclosure of pharmaceutical
pricing, so long as trade secrecy is established even minimally. The
trade secret statutes, however, do not support this conclusion.
Rather, trade secrecy mirrors its sister intellectual property doctrines
in their nuanced and delicate balancing of public interests.
The Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts do not reflect a onesided regime. Despite its title (“defend trade secrets”), the Federal
Act reflects the same balance of interests seen in enactments of the
state Uniform Acts. Both are utilitarian statutes that, as their texts
demonstrate, seek to balance the rights and obligations of those who
create and share non-public, unpatented 178 business information.
Both promote economic activity by providing limited rights in
information that meets threshold requirements in order to
incentivize investments in the infrastructure needed for innovation,
but both also protect parties accused of misappropriation by
providing a wide variety of defenses—and, in some cases, sanctions
177
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against the trade secret claimant.179 Above all, by limiting the scope
of trade secret rights, the Federal Act and the state Uniform Acts
ultimately serve the public interest by securing a broad freedom to
use and enjoy unprotected information. In both the judicial and
legislative realms, trade secret embeds a substantial dedication to
the public interest, by maintaining a robust public domain. Trade
secrets are not natural rights. They do not exist outside the legal
framework, and there is no metaphysical quality to their
conception. 180 As such, trade secret should not be used a tool to
hammer an unwitting public.
The goal of intellectual property is to bring innovations to society
for their use. This is framed by the general economic argument that
free markets are able to maximize social utility for the nation’s
citizens. 181 We interfere with the free market—by granting
intellectual property rights to inventors—solely to provide the
incentive for inventors to create their innovations and share those
innovations with society. Yes, competitors might beat out the prices,
if they knew them. That is the point of a free market.182 Society
deviates from that system only to the extent incentives are necessary,
and the intellectual property systems are designed to limit
protections to those things legislatures have determined are needed
to provide the requisite incentives. The robust freedom to use lots of
information reflects the fact that use of the information is the goal
in the first place.
Thus, for the point discussed here, the relevant public interest is the
free-market economy and the free use of innovations. Those general
values are buttressed further by the nation’s historic interest in
179
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freedom of speech, which is reflected in the First Amendment.183
This is not to suggest that all information unprotected by trade secret
is strictly necessary for First Amendment protections. Rather the
free flow of information is a value deeply embedded in the nation’s
history and reflected in the balances struck in the US intellectual
property system between protected information and information that
is free to all and reserved to none. Once again, this stands in contrast
to any notion of innovation as the moral or natural right of
inventors—a concept generally foreign to the history and theory of
intellectual property in the United States.184
As trade secret emerges fully into the pantheon of intellectual
property protections, this area of law must develop its own concepts
for articulating the limits of its reach. No intellectual property right
can be boundless. Consistent with their utilitarian underpinnings, all
intellectual property rights must establish their limits and endpoints
in a manner that properly reflect the public policy balances reflected
therein.
With trade secret becoming a weapon of choice in contemporary
intellectual property litigation, there is a growing risk that it will be
used in manners far beyond its animating logic of balancing interests
between parties, generally those who were in privity with one
another, regarding ordinary-course business information. Thus,
courts should consider borrowing from copyright to develop its own
version of thinness. 185 Thin trade secret would exist when the
independent economic value or creation aspect of the secret is scant,
183
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such that the item of information qualifies for protection, but only
just so.186 Unlike secret formula and manufacturing techniques, thin
information would exist near the margins of trade secret protection.
At this distance from the core conceptualization of what is
protectable, they would rest on a lighter limb of the trade secret tree.
In that case, the tug of a countervailing public policy interest would
have particular force. One would not want defendants to simply
claim any interest in the guise of public policy, however. Thus, thin
copyright could be designed primarily for circumstances in which
trade secret comes into conflict with other doctrinal areas
embodying their own public policies. In those circumstances, the
doctrine of thin trade secret creates space for navigating the
boundaries.
The doctrine of thin trade secret is distinct from the notion of
confidential-but-not-secret information that a relational, nonproperty conception of trade secret law would entertain. Thin trade
secret operates only when the information is within the bounds of
statutory trade secret status, albeit at the edge of those bounds. In
this manner, thin trade secret avoids the trap of creating a vague
second tier of protectable information that falls outside the bounds
of statutory trade secret protection, a development which would only
incentivize the aggressive litigation of weak and nebulous claims,
without the framework of rules and defenses the trade secret statutes
provide to adjudicate and rebut such claims. There is a risk, of
course, that with the existence of thin trade secret, judges could
inadvertently sweep unwarranted information into the trade secret
fold. Information might be easier to declare a trade secret, given the
comfort of being able to deny protection in a particular case through
the public interest. Without great care, such an approach could allow
the boundaries of trade secret to creep ever wider across time. All
jurisprudential arenas, however, face the temptation of rules of
convenience, and the antidote is the same throughout. Regardless
of the doctrinal area, courts and commentators must find analyses
that can be applied with logical consistency across the regime, rather
than resting on handy decisions in a particular case that create
distinctions without a difference.187
186
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The concept of thin trade secret has the potential to protect trade
secret regime from a societal backlash as new claims stray into
uncharted territory. Without such an outlet, courts, in frustration
over expansive claiming, could be tempted to slash large and
ambiguous swaths of territory, generating confusion in trade secret
doctrine. By delineating an area of greater force for public policy,
thin trade secret would cabin analysis into a common zone for
discussion and thus lessen the chance of mayhem throughout the
regime. To be sure, developing a theory of thin trade secret cannot
be accomplished in one step. Practical questions, such as what
justifications permit application of the concept and what degree of
use or disclosure in particular concepts are weighed against
protection, await future commentary.
One could conceivably consider borrowing from copyright to
develop a fair use trade secret defense. In that vein, courts could
examine whether other policies might outweigh a finding that a
party’s trade secret has been used. Thinness, however, has the
advantage of signaling that the supposed trade secret just barely
makes it over the line, a conclusion that seems particularly
appropriate for these circumstances.
Although intellectual property misuse may provide a useful pathway,
we believe that more narrow and targeted rules will be important. In
particular, at the dawn of doctrinal development, one would be welladvised to proceed with caution. Thus, the concept of thin trade
secret provides a careful approach for recognition of expanding
areas of innovation without trampling the public policies reflected
in doctrinal areas with which trade secret must interact.
Once again, the example of drug prices and regulatory disclosure is
illustrative. As described above, naked price does not fall within the
bounds of trade secrets. Even if a court were to find that bare
negotiated price points between PBMs and pharmaceutical
manufacturers fell within the bounds of trade secrets, those rights
would be achingly close to the line. At most, if pricing information
in the special context of PBM agreements were deemed to be a trade
secret at all, it would be a thin and untraditional right, not core
intellectual property. It should pale in comparison to thick IP rights
such as manufacturing process details, formula details, and other
scientific work products. A thin, barely-over-the-line trade secret
hardly deserves the same deference in a regulatory disclosure
context as the latter types of information.
It should be particularly susceptible to the public policy concerns
underlying the need for disclosure in a regulatory context. Such a
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status should not be a hard binary, or immunity, against regulatory
disclosure when the public interest so warrants.188
VII. EMPLOYING THE TOOLS OF TRADE SECRET DOCTRINE
Although new concepts are needed to bring coherence and to reign
in the overreach of trade secret, one should not ignore the practical
tools in existence which can assist in implementing these concepts.
It is important to recognize that trade secret law already contains
approaches that can be useful for courts, regulatory agencies, and
legislatures to use in preventing trade secret from running rampant.
In particular, procedural mechanisms borrowed from civil trade
secret litigation can help attorneys for government entities push
back against cookie-cutter, overbroad claims to trade secrecy,
thereby separating unprotectable pricing information from other
information subject to trade secret protection. These mechanisms
also offer a means to introduce the concept of “thin” trade secret
protection into already-recognized frameworks for defining and
narrowing a party’s claimed trade secrets.
A. Rejecting Overly Conclusory Industry Submissions
To begin with, courts should be prepared to reject vague, check-thebox declarations submitted by pharmaceutical companies declaring
high-level categories of information to be trade secrets, in
conclusory language. As discussed above, recent litigation has seen
a flurry of such overbroad secrecy assertions. In the 2017 Nevada
case, for example, declarants and their attorneys used such phrases
as “confidential, completely sensitive, proprietary information
regarding the production, cost, pricing, marketing, and advertising
of their patented diabetes medicines” and “cost structure, resource
allocation, and pricing practices.”189
This type of argument does not come close to articulating specific,
precise information asserted to constitute trade secrets, and thus
renders it difficult for courts (and government attorneys) to focus
arguments on precise information such as price, rebates, and profits
188
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margins for a specific agreement. Just as some courts have rejected
overly conclusory submissions by those seeking to prevent
regulatory disclosure of pricing information in other contexts,190 the
same should hold true in litigation over PBM pricing agreements.
B. Requiring Particularized Identification of Asserted Trade
Secrets
Courts can apply analogous techniques with asserted claims, as well
as with party declarations. Specifically, a powerful means to push
back against contentions that pharmaceutical pricing constitutes a
trade secret is to insist that those claiming trade secret protection
identify, with at least reasonable particularity, each separate item of
information asserted as a trade secret. This tool, which can be
borrowed from decades of civil litigation, can be an effective means
to prevent vague, overbroad secrecy contentions deployed to hide
narrower items that hardly deserve protection.
In civil trade secret litigation, the plaintiff tactically expresses its
alleged trade secrets in a generalized and conclusory fashion, in
order to prevent the defendant from preparing defenses such as nonsecrecy, and to afford maximum latitude to shape-shift the claims to
conform to the defendant’s own technology once the technology is
produced during discovery. In response, two state legislatures have
required that plaintiffs identify the alleged trade secrets with some
particularity before discovery begins. 191 Many other courts,
including federal courts, have imposed that pre-discovery
requirement through case law. 192 Still others have enforced a
190
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similar requirement during discovery disputes, by requiring that a
plaintiff provide specific answers to a defendant’s interrogatory
seeking a clear description of each alleged trade secret.193 What
often results is a numbered list of written claims, though sometimes
several rounds of motion practice are required to obtain clear
information.
In the regulatory context, courts can leverage this case law by
analogy to require pharmaceutical companies asserting trade
secrecy rights to identify purported trade secrets with precision.
This will better allow regulatory disclosure to focus on the narrow,
exact pricing information to be disclosed, while barring companies
from using conclusory language and bundles of information to
prevent a focus on whether such precise information constitutes a
trade secret.
C. Parsing Combination/Compilation Trade Secret Claims
Third, courts, legislatures, and regulatory agencies should not allow
pharmaceutical companies to rely on allegations of so-called
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compilation, or combination, of trade secret claims as a means to
prevent the regulatory disclosure of narrower items of information.
In general, a combination trade secret can be an uncontroversial
concept: that individual items, each of which may not be a trade
secret on its own, can nonetheless be combined in a novel manner
in order to form a single, unified process that itself constitutes a trade
secret. But in such intellectual property, the trade secret right lies in
the interrelated unit as a whole. Owning a protectable combination
trade secret does not render individual items within it as trade secrets
as well; each such item is only a trade secret if it so qualifies, on its
own.
In some instances, trade secret claimants employ artificial
combinations to prevent a showing that individual items do not
constitute trade secrets.194 To prevent such tactics by PBMs, courts
should focus on the narrow and precise pricing items to be disclosed.
Companies which protest that disclosing discrete pricing
information requires the disclosure of broader combination-sets
should be required to disaggregate such claims in order to focus
courts on what is really at issue.
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CONCLUSION
It would be ironic if the very thing regulators seek to combat—
artificially high pharmaceutical pricing abetted by opaque deals
between PBMs and manufacturers—could itself be claimed as a
form of intellectual property, immune from regulatory disclosure.
Healthy skepticism about such IP claims is in order when the motive
behind the claim is to avoid regulation and transparency in the strong
public interest. The special context of pricing in PBM agreements
is not a viable candidate for trade secrecy, and even if it were, such
thin trade secrecy contentions should not be a shield against
regulatory disclosure.

128

